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THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF  
WEAK PATENTS 
William Hubbard* 
Abstract: Does U.S. patent law increase the competitiveness of U.S. firms 
in global markets? This Article argues that, contrary to the beliefs of many 
U.S. lawmakers, U.S. patent law currently undermines the ability of U.S. 
firms to compete in global markets because strong U.S. patent rights ac-
tually weaken an overlooked but critical determinant of U.S. competitive-
ness: rivalry among U.S. firms. Intense domestic rivalry drives firms to 
improve relentlessly, spawns related and supporting domestic industries, 
and encourages the domestic development of advanced factors of pro-
duction—like specialized labor forces. U.S. patents restrict rivalry among 
foreign firms less because U.S. patents have little extraterritorial effect. 
Moreover, due to legal and economic differences between the United 
States and other countries, foreign patents do not equilibrate competitive 
conditions abroad. Consequently, for U.S. firms to benefit from the same 
competitive environment as foreign firms, U.S. patents should be weak-
ened. Such changes, however, also threaten to reduce U.S. competitive-
ness because U.S. patents promote the development of new inventions 
that help U.S. firms compete in global markets. This Article thus exposes 
a deep tension in U.S. economic policy. Unfortunately, lawmakers have 
failed to recognize this tradeoff and, as a result, have adopted excessively 
strong patent protections that undermine U.S. competitiveness. This Ar-
ticle addresses this problem by proposing balanced reforms that will se-
lectively weaken U.S. patent protection to increase U.S. competitive ad-
vantage. 
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Introduction 
 Current U.S. patent law is based on a fundamental misconception 
regarding the effects of U.S. patents on U.S. competitiveness. The con-
ventional view is that U.S. patents help firms in the United States to 
compete against foreign rivals because U.S. patents provide U.S. inven-
tors with exclusive rights that promote the discovery of socially benefi-
cial inventions. Nevertheless, conventionalists recognize that exclusive 
patent rights also inhibit competition regarding new inventions, and 
that competition provides many benefits for society. As a result, U.S. 
policymakers typically have tried to balance the incentive effect of U.S. 
patents against the competitive costs.1 When considering U.S. competi-
tiveness in global markets, however, conventionalists have failed to un-
derstand the impact of territoriality on U.S. patent law and U.S. com-
petitiveness. This Article strives to correct these errors. 
 Certainly, U.S. patent law is closely related to competition in global 
markets. By providing inventors with exclusive rights to their discover-
ies, U.S. patents encourage innovation,2 and companies in the United 
States frequently outcompete their international rivals by developing 
better products or cheaper manufacturing processes.3 Focusing on the 
incentive effect of U.S. patents, U.S. lawmakers have long argued that 
strong U.S. patents increase U.S. competitiveness.4 Many commenta-
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly 6 
(2008) (discussing the “need to strike a balance between providing sufficient incentive for 
creation and the freedom to make use of existing ideas”); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High 
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1255, 1258–59 (2009). 
2 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to “promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the ex-
clusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”); William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 294 (2003) (“The 
standard rationale of patent law is that it is an efficient method of enabling the benefits of 
research and development to be internalized, thus promoting innovation and technologi-
cal progress.”). Not all new discoveries, however, are patentable inventions. Bilski v. Kap-
pos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 443 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) 
(stating that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot be patented). 
3 See Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations 508 (1990) (rec-
ognizing that “productivity in American industry as a whole is still at or near the top com-
pared to any nation”); see also id. at 70–76 (discussing the determinants of competitive 
advantage). 
4 See, e.g., Review of Findings of the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 99th Cong. 11 (1985) (Senate Finance Committee Staff 
Memorandum) (recommending that, to enhance U.S. competitiveness, “greater protec-
tion . . . be given intellectual property”); 157 Cong. Rec. S5411 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Strengthening of our patent system will not only help 
lead us out of these tough economic times, but it will help us maintain our competitive 
2013] The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents 1911 
tors agree, asserting for instance that “[o]ne of the historical strengths 
of the U.S. science, engineering and technology enterprise has been 
the vigorous protection of [intellectual property] rights.”5 Indeed, 
some lawmakers apparently believe that U.S. patents predominately 
issue to U.S. inventors and that improvements to the U.S. patent system 
will therefore inure to the benefit of U.S. innovators, not foreign 
firms.6 Bolstered by these arguments, patent rights have grown more 
robust in the United States than in almost any other country.7 
                                                                                                                      
 
edge both domestically and abroad.”); 157 Cong. Rec. S5433 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Mark Kirk) (stating that legislation that “strengthen[s] our patent sys-
tem . . . [will] bolster our global competiveness [sic]”); 157 Cong. Rec. E1206 (daily ed. 
June 24, 2011) (statement of Rep. Chris Van Hollen) (indicating that “stronger patents . . . 
enhance our nation’s economic competitiveness”); 153 Cong. Rec. 23706 (2007) (arguing 
that legislation resulting in weaker patent protection “is a severe threat to American inno-
vation, American jobs and American competitiveness”); 148 Cong. Rec. 18139 (2002) 
(claiming that a proposed bill “promotes America’s economic competitiveness by 
strengthening protections for intellectual property”); 143 Cong. Rec. 4359 (1997) (“[W]e 
have had the strongest patent protection of any country of the world, and that is what has 
ensured the American people for these last 200 years the ability to have a higher standard 
of living than other countries of the world, because we were able to out-compete them.”); 
132 Cong. Rec. 18753 (1986) (“Our competitiveness is closely tied to innovations which 
are promoted and protected by strong laws on patents, copyrights and trademarks.”); 131 
Cong. Rec. 21739 (1985) (stating that “strengthening intellectual property rights was cited 
as a major prescription for ensuring America’s continued prosperity and economic com-
petitiveness”); see also Council of Econ. Advisers, Economic Report of the President 
229 (2006) (discussing a bill proposed in 2005 that “would strengthen intellectual property 
protection”). 
5 Council on Competitiveness, Competitiveness Index: Where America Stands 
77, 81 (2007); see also Boldrin & Levine, supra note 1, at 46 (noting that industries have 
successfully lobbied the U.S. government to strengthen intellectual property rights during 
time periods marked by “slow productivity growth”); James J. Anton et al., Policy Implications 
of Weak Patent Rights, in 6 Innovation Policy and the Economy 1 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. 
eds., 2006) (describing potential problems stemming from weak patent rights). 
6 See Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Comment of Senator Leahy on the Senate Mo-
tion to Proceed to the America Invents Act (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/ 
press/comment-of-senator-leahy-on-the-senate-motion-to-proceed-to-the-america-invents-act 
(arguing that reforms to U.S. patent laws would “give American inventors and innovators the 
21st century patent system they need to compete”); see also Joseph Allen, Reexamination: 
Boone or Bane?, Panel Remarks at the Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United 
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (Apr. 11, 1980), in 88 F.R.D. 369, 415 (1980) 
(“We feel very strongly that, by improving the patent system, we’re helping not only the Pat-
ent Bar and the Office, but also American inventors and innovative companies become more 
successful in increasingly difficult competition.”). 
7 See Boldrin & Levine, supra note 1, at 46 (noting that “business practices and finan-
cial securities” are patentable in the United States but not in “most of the rest of the 
world”); Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 2 (indicating that, during the 1970s, 1980s, 
and even the 1990s, people believed that the United States was losing competitive ground 
to other nations, particularly Japan, and that emphasis on technological innovation was 
necessary to prevent further decline); see also Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discon-
1912 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1909 
 Nevertheless, the incentive effect of U.S. patent law often provides 
U.S. innovators with little advantage over foreign rivals because inven-
tors worldwide can obtain U.S. patents.8 Indeed, because only U.S. pat-
ents can be asserted in the United States and because the U.S. economy 
is the largest market in the world, foreign inventors are obtaining U.S. 
patents in record numbers.9 In recent years, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (“U.S. Patent Office”) has issued more U.S. patents 
to foreign inventors than to U.S. inventors.10 
 In contrast to the similar incentive effects of U.S. patents on U.S. 
and foreign firms, the harms to competition stemming from U.S. pat-
ents fall disproportionately on firms in the United States. U.S. patents 
have little effect on competition in foreign markets due to limits on the 
extraterritorial effect of U.S. law.11 Some traditional patent policymak-
ers have recognized that U.S. patents therefore can limit the techno-
logical tools available to firms within the United States while leaving 
foreign rivals relatively unconstrained. As a result, U.S. lawmakers have 
                                                                                                                      
tents: A Case Study of the TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 Calif. L. 
Rev. 1571, 1588–1616 (2009) (describing differences between Indian patent law and U.S. 
patent law and demonstrating that patent protections in India are weaker than protections 
in the United States, particularly for pharmaceutical inventions). 
8 See William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 341, 354 (2013). This 
equal access to U.S. patents is generally good for the U.S. economy because protectionism 
can harm domestic prosperity by increasing prices and insulating domestic businesses 
from competitive pressures. See id. at 361–63 (arguing against protectionist patent law). 
9 See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 889–90 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that foreign 
patents cannot be asserted in the United States); U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963–
2012, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. ( June 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ 
ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf (illustrating the number of U.S. patents issued to foreign inves-
tors); World Top Consumer Markets Ranking, 1Reservoir (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.1reservoir. 
com/awow-8788 (ranking the United States as the top consumer market). 
10 See U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963–2012, supra note 9. Another reason for 
the traditional misunderstanding of the effects of U.S. patent law on U.S. competitiveness 
is that analyses of U.S. competitiveness often only consider issues related to firms head-
quartered in the United States. A broader analysis is appropriate for at least two reasons. 
First, firms headquartered abroad, but operating in the United States, contribute signifi-
cantly to U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Second, even when headquartered in an-
other country, a business unit in the United States can contribute to intense U.S. domestic 
rivalry, which in turn can help to make firms headquartered in the United States more 
competitive in global markets. Because of these concerns, this Article defines “U.S. firm” 
and similar phrases broadly to include all business endeavors that contribute to U.S. GDP. 
Similarly, “foreign firms” and similar phrases refer to business units that do not contribute 
to U.S. GDP. See infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
11 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) (holding that 
under U.S. patent law, making or using a patented product outside of the United States 
does not constitute an infringement); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 
1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Section 271(a) [of Title 35] is only actionable against patent in-
fringement that occurs within the United States.”). 
2013] The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents 1913 
sought to convince other countries to strengthen their patent laws to 
match U.S. patent law.12 Although many countries have refused, the 
United States has nevertheless maintained high levels of patent protec-
tion, ostensibly because the benefits still outweigh the costs.13 U.S. pat-
ent policymakers have also ignored an additional cost inherent to U.S. 
patent protection: U.S. patents weaken rivalry among competitors in the 
United States—and domestic rivalry substantially impacts competitive 
advantage.14 For example, intense domestic rivalry drives firms to im-
prove and to reduce internal inefficiencies.15 Domestic rivalry also en-
courages the development of advanced factors of production, like 
technological information, and helps to spawn important supporting 
industries, like suppliers and manufacturers of related products.16 
 Having failed to consider all of the costs of strong patent protec-
tion, U.S. lawmakers have embraced patent laws that actually under-
mine U.S. competitiveness. To maximize U.S. competitive advantage, 
patent protection in the United States should be weakened.17 Yet re-
ducing the strength of U.S. patent rights could undermine incentives 
to invent in the United States, and new inventions are often vital to U.S. 
competitiveness. The competitive benefits of weakening U.S. patent 
rights, then, must be weighed against the costs. This Article proposes 
both general and specific reforms to U.S. patent law that will improve 
the balancing of these countervailing effects on U.S. competitiveness.18 
                                                                                                                      
 
12 S. Rep. No. 104-394, at 6 (1996) (“For more than a decade, a major objective of U.S. 
international trade negotiations has been strengthening intellectual property protections 
worldwide.”); see also Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1571 (describing the “trend of ‘upward 
harmonization,’” pursuant to which foreign law is strengthened to match the protections 
provided by U.S. patent law). 
13 E.g., Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 
979, 980 (2009) (describing international opposition to the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)); Eric Pfanner, Europeans Reject Treaty to 
Combat Digital Piracy, N.Y. Times, July 5, 2012, at B5 (describing the European Parliament’s 
rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement). 
14 Porter, supra note 3, at 117; see infra notes 155–167 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing how strong U.S. patent law may harm U.S. competitiveness). 
15 Harry S. Gerla, Restoring Rivalry as a Central Concept in Antitrust Law, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 
209, 224 (1996). 
16 See Porter, supra note 3, at 45–46, 73–77, 103–06; see also infra notes 52–55 and ac-
companying text (discussing specialized and advanced factors of production). 
17 Weak patent rights should not be confused with patents produced by a weak patent 
system. For example, a weak patent system may produce low-quality patents, like patents 
that are likely to be invalid, but patents that provide owners with only limited rights are 
weak patents. 
18 Admittedly, efforts to increase U.S. competitive advantage may not maximize global 
wealth. For example, spending a certain amount of U.S. federal tax revenue to improve 
public education in the United States might improve the quality of the U.S. labor market, 
1914 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1909 
 This Article proceeds in three primary parts. Part I examines the 
importance of competitive advantage and the current state of U.S. 
competitiveness in global markets, and further describes two important 
determinants of competitive advantage: factor conditions and domestic 
rivalry.19 Part II explores the effect of U.S. patent law on these deter-
minants by analyzing the relationships among patents, competition, 
and innovation. Using this framework, Part II evaluates the effective-
ness of current approaches to using patent law to increase U.S. com-
petitive advantage, concluding that they are ineffective.20 Part III ar-
gues that to increase U.S. competitiveness, U.S. patent rights should be 
weakened, and further analyzes the empirical challenges inherent to 
any effort to restructure U.S. patent law to maximize U.S. competitive-
ness.21 Part III proposes changes that will cost-effectively weaken U.S. 
patent protection in ways that will account for these empirical com-
plexities.22 
I. Enhancing U.S. Competitive Advantage 
                                                                                                                     
A. The Importance of Competitive Advantage 
 The success in global markets of firms headquartered and oper-
ated in the United States is vital to American economic prosperity.23 If 
such firms fail to compete against foreign rivals, U.S. citizens will be less 
able to obtain jobs, and U.S. business owners may lose profits. Dimin-
ished U.S. competitiveness also leads to decreased foreign and domes-
tic investment in businesses in the United States, which may further 
limit domestic employment opportunities. Reduced employment and 
business activity in the United States generate smaller tax revenues for 
federal and local governments. The U.S. economy also suffers when a 
multinational corporation decides to close or downsize a business unit 
 
thereby helping some U.S. companies compete in global markets and marginally increas-
ing global wealth. But spending that same sum of money may have a greater effect on edu-
cation or public health in another country, thereby increasing global wealth more substan-
tially. The scope of this Article, however, does not extend to the impact of U.S. competitive 
advantage on global wealth. 
19 See infra notes 23–90 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 91–194 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 195–321 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra 238–321 and accompanying text. 
23 Cf. Michael A. Utton, International Competition Policy: Maintaining Open 
Markets in the Global Economy, at vi (2006) (“While more and more countries adopt 
policies to regulate competition within their borders, at the same time many cases take on 
an international dimension.”). 
2013] The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents 1915 
located in the United States. And when a corporation expands a for-
eign business unit rather than a U.S. facility, the U.S. economy may lose 
thin the same multinational corporation, the U.S. 
con
te successfully against foreign rivals in high-productivity endeav-
s.2
                                                                                                                     
a growth opportunity. 
 As a result, this Article defines “U.S. company” and similar terms 
broadly to include any business unit that contributes to U.S. gross do-
mestic product (GDP). For example, a U.S. factory is considered a U.S. 
firm in this Article even if it is owned by a firm with facilities in other 
countries, and those foreign business units are “foreign firms” for the 
purposes of this Article. When U.S. companies—under this inclusive 
definition of that term—succeed in global markets, the U.S. economy 
prospers. Conversely, when economic endeavors located in the United 
States fail to compete against international rivals, including foreign 
business units wi
e omy suffers. 
 The competitiveness of U.S. companies in high-productivity indus-
tries is particularly important. Productivity describes the amount of 
economic value produced by a given quantity of labor, and labor that 
generates substantial value is commensurately well-compensated.24 
Productivity is the primary determinant of national per capita income 
and, consequently, of national standard of living.25 “If the industries 
that are losing position to foreign rivals are the relatively more produc-
tive ones in the economy, a nation’s ability to sustain productivity 
growth is threatened.”26 Thus, maintaining and improving standards of 
living in the United States depends on the capacity of U.S. firms to 
compe
or 7 
 Unfortunately, by some measures, the competitiveness of U.S. 
companies in global markets has been waning.28 For example, the 
 
24 Porter, supra note 3, at 6. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 8. Similarly, standards of living are threatened “when activities involving high 
levels of productivity (such as sophisticated manufacturing) are transferred abroad 
through foreign investment.” Id. 
27 See Gerla, supra note 15, at 254 (“Trillions of dollars, millions of jobs, and the standard 
of living of the nation ride on the development of [globally competitive] industries.”). 
28 See, e.g., Porter, supra note 3, at 12 (“America, with skilled labor, preeminent scien-
tists, and ample capital, has seen eroding export market shares in industries where one 
would least expect it, such as machine tools, semiconductors, and sophisticated electronic 
products.”). On the other hand, some economic studies provide a more optimistic view of 
U.S. competitiveness. See, e.g., Frederick E. Allen, The U.S. Still Leads the World in Competi-
tiveness, Forbes (May 30, 2012, 6:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/frederickallen/ 
2012/05/30/the-u-s-still-leads-the-world-in-competitiveness/ (describing a recent analysis of 
competitiveness that concludes that the United States enjoys superlative competitiveness). 
1916 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1909 
World Economic Forum (“WEF”) measures competitiveness by analyz-
ing a number of related characteristics, including the quality of educa-
tion and training; the efficiency of labor and capital markets; infrastruc-
ture; technological readiness; business sophistication; and innovation.29 
In 2007 and 2008, the United States topped the WEF competitiveness 
rankings.30 Thereafter, however, the United States began to drop in the 
rankings, slipping to second in 2009, fourth in 2010, fifth in 2011, and 
seventh in 2012.31 A recent study conducted by Harvard Business 
School similarly indicates that the competitiveness of U.S. firms has de-
creased.32 When more than 50,000 alumni of the school were surveyed 
about “the extent to which firms operating in the U.S. are able to com-
pete successfully in the global economy while supporting high and ris-
ing living standards for Americans,” more than 71% of the respondents 
     
believed that U.S. competitiveness would “deteriorate.”33 
 Recent measures of some of the factors that affect competitiveness 
raise further questions about the future of U.S. competitiveness.34 For 
example, the availability of a highly trained and educated labor force 
affects the competitiveness of domestic firms. Unfortunately, the U.S. 
educational system notoriously underachieves, particularly in science, 
technology, engineering, and math.35 Most of the world’s high school 
students outperform U.S. high school students on international math 
and science tests,36 and the United States ranks seventeenth in the 
                                                                                                                 
29 World Econ. Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2008–2009, at 4–6 
(20
rum.org/news/us-competitiveness- 
ran
k: Findings of Harvard 
Bus ’s Survey on U.S. Competitiveness 3 (2012). 
2–90 and accompanying text (discussing the determinants of competitive advan-
tage
e Norman R. Augustine, Is America Falling Off the Flat Earth? 30–34 
(20
p:// 
istics regarding the weaker performance of U.S. 
scho s). 
09). 
30 Id. at 10. 
31 World Econ. Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013, at 13 
(2012); World Econ. Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011, at 15 
(2010); Kai Bucher, US Competitiveness Ranking Continues to Fall; Emerging Markets Are Closing the 
Gap, World Econ. F., (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.wefo
king-continues-fall-emerging-markets-are-closing-gap. 
32 Michael E. Porter & Jan W. Rivkin, Prosperity at Ris
iness School
33 Id. at 3–4. 
34 See infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (illustrating this proposition); infra 
notes 4
). 
35 Se
07). 
36 Council on Competitiveness, Innovate America: National Innovation Initiative 
Summit and Report 49 (2005); see also Nat’l Math & Sci. Initiative, The Results Are in: The 
National Math and Science Initiative’s Comprehensive AP Program Works 1–2 (2013), htt
www.nms.org/Portals/0/Images/pages/researchAndResults/NMSI%20Infographic%20 
Handout_double-sided_v2.pdf (providing stat
ols vis-à-vis foreign educational system
2013] The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents 1917 
world in high school graduation rate.37 Performance in higher educa-
tion is similar: the United States ranks fourteenth in the world in per 
capita college graduation rates, and thirteenth in the world in doctoral 
graduation rates.38 Unsurprisingly, this educational mediocrity leads to 
a lack of researchers in the United States;39 and many U.S. companies 
now send their research and development efforts overseas.40 According 
to the National Science Foundation, almost a quarter of all research 
and development workers employed by U.S. companies work outside of 
the United States.41 
structure, and rivalry.43 Each determinant affects the others, and they 
  
B. Determinants of Competitive Advantage 
 Competitive advantage depends on the interaction of numerous 
economic considerations. In his seminal work The Competitive Advantage 
of Nations, celebrated economist Michael Porter analyzes the factors 
that give businesses in some countries competitive advantages over 
their international rivals. Porter argues that “firms gain and sustain 
competitive advantage in international competition through [continu-
ous] improvement, innovation, and upgrading.”42 Porter identifies four 
determinants that contribute to the capacity of domestic firms to im-
prove, innovate, and upgrade: (1) factor conditions; (2) related and 
supporting industries; (3) demand conditions; and (4) firm strategy, 
                                                                                                                    
scoreboard-2011-en& 
acce Similarly, the United 
Stat
& Tech. Online, http:// 
www
research and development 
emp
ted 43–44 (2010) (arguing that innovation spurs a competitive economy). 
Por
 
37 Augustine, supra note 35, at 19. 
38 Id. at 19; New Doctorate Graduates, OECD iLibrary, http://www.oecd-ilibrary. 
org/sites/sti_scoreboard-2011-en/02/01/index.html?contentType=&itemId=/content/ 
book/sti_scoreboard-2011-en&containerItemId=/content/book/sti_
ssItemIds=&mimeType=text/html (last visited Oct. 3, 2013). 
es ranks twenty-sixth in the world in the percentage of doctoral degrees that are 
awarded in science and engineering. New Doctorate Graduates, supra. 
39 See Council on Competitiveness, supra note 36, at 49. 
40 Ron Hira, U.S. Workers in a Global Job Market, Issues in Sci. 
.issues.org/25.3/hira.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2013). For example, General Electric, a 
company founded by American Thomas Edison, now has more 
loyees located outside of the United States than within it. Id. 
41 Francisco Moris & Nirmala Kannankutty, New Employment Statistics from the 2008 Busi-
ness R&D and Innovation Survey, Infobrief, July 2010, at 1, 1. 
42 Porter, supra note 3, at 70; see Augustine et al., Nat’l Acad. of Scis., Nat’l 
Acad. of Eng’g, & Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., Rising Above the Gathering 
Storm, Revisi
ter notes that this process of improving goods and services must be on-going because 
the advantages of today’s products are superseded by future improvements. Porter, supra 
note 3, at 51. 
43 Porter, supra note 3, at 71. Factor conditions are “[t]he nation’s position in factors 
of production, such as skilled labor or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given in-
1918 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1909 
are all affected by both chance and government, including law.44 A full 
discussion of Porter’s analysis of the determinants of competitive ad-
vantage is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article focuses 
on two determinants of competitive advantage: factor conditions and 
domestic rivalry.45 
1. Factor Conditions 
 Factor conditions depend upon the cost and availability of “factors 
of production,” which are “the inputs necessary to compete in any in-
dustry, such as labor, arable land, natural resources, capital, and infra-
structure.”46 For example, the large quantities of arable land in the 
United States help the nation lead the world in many agricultural mar-
kets.47 Although countries may face different factor endowments, 
“globalization has made local availability of some factors less essen-
tial.”48 Raw materials, for instance, can often be purchased on global 
markets even if they are otherwise unavailable locally.49 
 Some types of factors of production contribute more to competi-
tive advantage than others. In many industries, cheap access to basic 
factors, like natural resources and unskilled labor, provide little sustain-
able competitive advantages because businesses in other countries can 
replicate these factor conditions.50 For example, although Chinese 
businesses have benefitted from cheap unskilled labor, other develop-
ing countries may soon have cheaper labor pools, particularly as Chi-
                                                                                                                      
dustry.” Id. Demand conditions are “[t]he nature of home demand for the industry’s 
product or service.” Id. Related and supporting industries are “[t]he presence or absence 
in the nation of supplier industries and related industries that are internationally competi-
tive
panies are created, organized, and managed, and 
the 
ge, pat-
ent law has little direct effect on them. 
ter, supra note 3, at 73–74. 
dition, “[b]asic factors are passively inherited, or their creation re-
quir
.” Id. (footnote omitted). Finally, firm strategy, structure, and rivalry are “[t]he condi-
tions in the nation governing how com
nature of domestic rivalry.” Id. 
44 Id. at 127. 
45 Although the remaining determinants are important to competitive advanta
46 Por
47 See id. at 294 (noting that “[t]he United States has been well endowed with natural 
factors of production, among them an exceptionally large supply of arable land”). 
48 Id. at 76. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 77. In ad
es relatively modest or unsophisticated private and social investment.” Id. They are 
important in “extractive or agriculturally based industries (such as timber and soybeans) 
and in those where technological and skill requirements are modest and technology is 
widely available.” Id. 
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nese economic success raises the cost of labor in China.51 In contrast, 
specialized and advanced factors of production, like high-speed inter-
net, modern infrastructure, and highly educated labor, “are now the 
most significant [factors] for competitive advantage,” particularly in 
high-productivity economic endeavors.52 Creating these specialized and 
advanced factors of production typically requires significant and sus-
ine
pat-
ent holder enjoys exclusive rights to commercialize the invention.55 
                                                                                                                     
ta d investment and effort.53 
 One important type of advanced, specialized factor of production is 
technological information. According to Porter, “Technological change 
can create new possibilities for the design of a product, the way it is 
marketed, produced, or delivered, and the ancillary services provided. It 
is the most common precursor of strategic innovation.”54 When com-
petitors can cheaply obtain the same technological information, how-
ever, it provides little durable competitive advantage. As discussed in 
more detail below, technological advantages that are patented provide 
more lasting competitive advantages because, although patents are pub-
lic documents that disclose the details of a patented invention, the 
 
51 Id. (noting that “[a]n unskilled worker is increasingly vulnerable to pressures on 
wag
ch higher-order advantages include, for example, differentiated 
pro y production technology. Id. Advanced factors are also “scarcer 
because their development demands large and often sustained investments in both human 
and
es”). Per capita gross domestic product in China has quadrupled since 1990. Richard 
A. Easterlin, When Growth Outpaces Happiness, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 2012, at A35, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/opinion/in-china-growth-outpaces-happiness.html. 
52 Porter, supra note 3, at 77. Advanced factors help to produce “higher-order” com-
petitive advantages. Id. Su
ducts and proprietar
 physical capital.” Id. 
53 Id. at 77–78. 
54 Id. at 45–46. 
55 See infra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
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2. Domestic Rivalry 
 Domestic rivalry is also critical to competitive advantage.56 Com-
petitors force one another to innovate, reduce costs, and improve qual-
ity and service.57 Rivals invest in improving their capacity to compete 
“as much from fear of falling behind as the inducement of getting 
ahead.”58 New business formation is vital to fostering rivalry because 
new businesses offer new services and target new markets that older 
companies do not acknowledge or are too unadaptable to react to 
themselves.59 Indeed, because of the need to challenge the advantages 
of existing companies, new entrants have clear incentives to develop 
innovations that render existing products or services obsolete.60 
 Rivalry also helps to reduce the inefficiences that exist within 
firms, such as when firms  “do not minimiz[e] their costs.”61 Numerous 
                                                                                                                      
56 Porter, supra note 3, at 117–24 (describing the strong productive effects of domes-
tic rivalry). Although Porter groups domestic rivalry with firm strategy and structure, this 
Article focuses on domestic rivalry. Nevertheless, firm strategy and structure also signifi-
cantly affect competitive advantage. For instance, “[n]ations will tend to succeed in indus-
tries where the management practices and modes of organization favored by the national 
envi ndustries’ sources of competitive advantage.” Porter, 
supr 08. Similarly, nations will thrive in industries whose firms pursue goals 
that
y large German corporations concentrate on longer-term 
goa
ir profits by maximizing output for a given input and by minimizing costs for a 
 
ronment are well suited to the i
a note 3, at 1
 cultivate sources of competitive advantage. For example, many large corporations in 
the United States are publicly traded and thus frequently focus on maximizing quarterly 
and annual share price. In contrast to the comparatively short-term focus of large, publicly 
traded U.S. companies, man
ls because significant numbers of shares are held by institutions like banks. Id. at 110–
11. Although the role of long-term investors in Germany may be changing, these German 
corporations currently “do well in mature industries requiring ongoing investment in re-
search and new facilities.” Id. at 111, 376–77. 
57 Id. at 118; accord Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters 
Innovation, 74 Antitrust L.J. 575, 579–81 (2007). As Judge Learned Hand observed more 
than sixty years ago, “Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic pow-
er deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from compe-
tition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of con-
stant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.” 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). 
58 Porter, supra note 3, at 118. 
59 Id. at 122. 
60 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technolo-
gies Cause Great Firms to Fail 45–48 (1997); Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of 
the Schumpeter-Arrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 393, 
406–08 (2008). 
61 Gerla, supra note 15, at 224; see Roger S. Frantz, X-Efficiency: Theory, Evidence 
and Applications 35 (2d ed. 1997) (“[Intrafirm inefficiency] was unknown because the 
orthodoxy of the day (and largely of today) assumes that firms are producing on both their 
production and cost function.”). Although the concept of intrafirm inefficiency “runs coun-
ter to a basic operating assumption of modern neoclassical economics—firms always seek to 
maximize the
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factors contribute to intrafirm inefficiencies, including lack of motiva-
tion, human inertia, and flaws in decision making.62 Rivalry helps to 
reduce intrafirm inefficiencies by pressuring employees of firms to be-
have more rationally.63 Indeed, several empirical studies have con-
firmed that rivalry reduces intrafirm inefficiencies.64 By one estimate, 
the cost of this type of inefficiency in the United States is more than $1 
trillion.65 Thus, rivalry helps encourage firms to eliminate enormously 
wasteful inefficiencies.66 Moreover, “[t]o the extent that rivalry curbs 
[intrafirm] inefficiencies in firms it can serve to facilitate the creation 
and commercial exploitation of innovations.”67 
 Although rivalry between foreign and domestic competitors is im-
portant to competitive advantage, domestic rivalry fosters competitive 
advantage more for at least three reasons.68 First, firms are more re-
sponsive to competition from domestic rivals. In general, firms face 
lower transaction costs in gathering detailed information about domes-
tic rivals than about foreign competitors.69 For example, language and 
                                                                                                                      
given rate” —severe intrafirm inefficiencies have been identified in numerous empirical 
studies. Gerla, supra note 15, at 224; see Frantz, supra, at 2. Significantly, intrafirm ineffi-
encyci  is different from the deadweight loss of allocative inefficiency. Frantz, supra, at 15, 35. 
Allocative inefficiency occurs when the actions of profit-maximizing firms reduce overall 
social welfare. Id. at 15. For example, allocative inefficiency arises when a monopolist maxi-
mizes profits by restricting output and raising prices. Even with a higher price, some con-
sumers will still purchase the monopolist’s products, but these consumers will transfer a 
greater amount of wealth to the monopolist than would occur under perfect competition. Id. 
Unfortunately, the monopolist’s profit-maximizing strategy reduces social wealth because 
som ay the monopolist’s supracompetitive prices. Id. These 
lost onsumers to the monopolist; instead, these 
sale erate gains from 
trad rs. Id. The loss of these sales represents a deadweight 
loss th. Id. Although the monopolist experiences losses from the deadweight 
loss, uction and thereby produce allocative inefficiency—
prov
pra note 15, at 227. 
cause it is difficult for firms from other countries to tap into such a process.”); see 
Bre Colum. L. Rev. 257, 268–70 (2007) 
 
e consumers will be unable to p
sales do not reflect a wealth transfer from c
s do not occur at all. Under perfect competition, those same sales gen
e for both consumers and produce
to social weal
 it is still willing to restrict prod
ided those losses do not exceed its gain from the consumer wealth transfer. See Frantz, 
supra, at 15. 
62 Frantz, supra note 61, at 35. 
63 Id. at 58; see Gerla, supra note 15, at 223. 
64 Frantz, supra note 61, at 224; Gerla, su
65 See Gerla, supra note 15, at 227. 
66 Id. at 254. 
67 Id. at 236 (footnote omitted). 
68 See id. at 247 (noting that “all rivalry is not fungible” and that domestic rivalry is 
more important than foreign rivalry in cultivating competitive advantage). Plainly, from 
the perspective of competitive advantage, rivalry between U.S. firms and foreign competi-
tors provides similar benefits to both firms and therefore may provide neither firm with 
significant relative advantage over the other. 
69 Porter, supra note 3, at 120 (“Ideas diffuse faster within the nation than across na-
tions, be
tt M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 
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cultural barriers may limit access to information about foreign com-
petitors. In addition, firms hire fewer employees from foreign competi-
tors than from domestic rivals, and employee mobility is an important 
conduit for the diffusion of certain forms of commercial information.70 
 Firms also may respond differently to information about domestic 
val
ecause domestic rivals face similar fac-
mpetitive advantage: related and supporting indus-
                                                                                                                     
ri s than to information about foreign competitors. Domestic rivalries 
often extend past economic issues and can become “emotional and 
even personal” because domestic firms fight for “bragging rights” as 
well as market share.71 In contrast, foreign rivals produce less intense 
competition, in part because the success of foreign rivals may be attrib-
uted to other determinants of competitive advantage, such as different 
factor conditions. In other words, “[w]ith domestic rivals, there are no 
excuses.”72 
 Second, domestic rivalry contributes more to competitive advan-
tage than international rivalry b
tor conditions. As a result, domestic rivalry prevents firms from de-
pending too heavily on less durable sources of competitive advantage, 
like cheap labor, because other domestic firms enjoy similar access to 
the same resources.73 Firms are forced to pursue more advanced fac-
tors of production, which are harder to develop and thus are more sus-
tainable sources of competitive advantage.74 For example, domestic 
rivals may create demand for highly trained employees, thereby pre-
cipitating specialized training programs.75 
 Third, domestic rivalry contributes more to competitive advantage 
than international rivalry because domestic rivalry catalyzes another 
determinant of co
tries. Importantly, domestic rivalry—not foreign rivalry—is the most im-
 
(asserting that innovation continually begets innovation, especially when geographically 
con e Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Dis-
trict n Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 576–77 
(1999) (describing geographical clusters of firms that form partly as a result of proximity 
of i
ikely have reduced some of these transaction costs to some 
exte
ample, “[w]ith a group of rivals, there are a 
num tial employers for graduates and several supporters and users of special-
ized
centrated); Ronald J. Gilson, Th
s: Silico
ndustry expertise). Concededly, technological innovations like the Internet and lan-
guage translation software l
nt. 
70 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 69, at 268. 
71 Porter, supra note 3, at 119. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.; see supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (discussing advanced and special-
ized factors of production). 
75 Porter, supra note 3, at 134. For ex
ber of poten
 facilities, programs, and knowledge.” Id. 
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portant factor in the growth of related and supporting industries.76 
Domestic rivals produce competitive markets for suppliers and com-
mercial opportunities for related industries.77 Indeed, related or sup-
plier companies are often founded by employees who leave domestic 
firms.78 Intense domestic rivalry also helps to generate advanced and 
specialized factors of production, which may benefit suppliers and re-
lated industries.79 
 Related and supporting industries facilitate competitive advantage 
by producing commercial synergies. Suppliers can “help firms perceive 
new methods and opportunities to apply new technology.”80 Related 
industries “share activities in the value chain” and therefore provide 
opportunities for valuable information exchange.81 For example, suc-
cessful domestic computer manufacturers may improve the competi-
tiveness of software companies. Moreover, firms generally face lower 
transaction costs in coordinating with domestic suppliers and related 
industries than with foreign industries.82 One reason for this is that 
“[p]roximity of managerial and technical personnel, along with cul-
ra
bodies, educational institutions, firms, and individuals to invest in rele-
van
     
tu l similarity, tends to facilitate free and open information flow.”83 
Together, the businesses, suppliers, and related industries in one loca-
tion form an economic “cluster.”84 As with the sharing of similar factor 
conditions, “[t]he existence of a cluster of several industries that draws 
on common inputs, skills, and infrastructure . . . stimulates government 
t factor creation or factor-creating mechanisms.”85 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                 
76 Id. at 138. 
77 Id. at 140. By way of illustration, “the concentration of rivals in movie and television 
production in Hollywood has led to the growth of a thriving and highly specialized group 
of supplier industries, ranging from special effects firms, to costume designers, to firms 
pro  at 139. 
t 140. 
 Id. at 105. 
viding production insurance.” Id.
78 Id. a
79 See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text. 
80 Porter, supra note 3, at 103. With domestic suppliers and industries, “[f]irms gain 
quick access to information, to new ideas and insights, and to supplier innovations.” Id. 
81
82 Id. Nations are often internationally competitive in related industries. Id. 
83 Id. at 103; accord id. at 106 (“Proximity and cultural similarity make such interchange 
easier than is the case with foreign firms.”); see U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, The Competi-
tiveness and Innovative Capacity of the United States 6–3 (2012) (suggesting that 
the overseas relocation of supporting manufacturing facilities could impair U.S. research 
and development). 
84 Porter, supra note 3, at 135. 
85 Id. 
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reduced transaction costs within an economic cluster facilitate the co-
ordination of research and development.86 
 In sum, “[a] group of capable domestic rivals . . . creates a fertile 
environment for creating and sustaining competitive advantage that is 
difficult to replicate through competition with foreign rivals.”87 It is 
important to note that Porter supported his analysis with both eco-
nomic arguments and empirical research. Porter analyzed the competi-
tive advantages of firms from ten countries over a period of four years 
with the help of a team of more than thirty researchers, and among his 
team’s str  rivalry 
tion, like lumber and crude 
                                                                                                                     
ongest findings was the connection between domestic
and competitive advantage.88 Porter concluded, “It is rare that a com-
pany can meet tough foreign rivals when it has faced no significant 
competition at home.”89 This empirical finding—that domestic rivalry 
significantly contributes to competitive advantage and productivity—
has been independently verified numerous times.90 
II. U.S. Patent Law and Competitive Advantage 
 Government and law can affect the determinants of competitive 
advantage.91 For example, education and immigration law can affect 
the availability of highly skilled labor.92 Likewise, environmental law can 
affect the cost of basic factors of produc
 
86
6–3. 
87 Porter, supra note 3, at 121. Significantly, firms that are headquartered overseas but 
ope ontribute to intense domestic rivalry in the United 
States, which in turn can help to make firms headquartered in the United States more 
com
 units that contribute to U.S. GDP. See 
supr
 n.29 (collecting sources which illustrate that in-
dus
supr
notes that “[i]t is tempting to make government 
the curate because government only indirectly affects 
com
 Id. at 103. Because domestic economic clusters are vital to competitive advantage, 
outsourcing certain aspects of an industry to foreign businesses can undermine long-term 
competitive advantage in the United States. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 83, at 
rate in the United States can c
petitive in global markets. The contribution to U.S. domestic rivalry of firms that are 
headquartered in foreign countries demonstrates the importance of defining “U.S. firm” 
and similar phrases broadly to include all business
a notes 23–24 and accompanying text (defining U.S. firms for the purposes of this 
Article). 
88 Porter, supra note 3, at 117. 
89 Id. at 119. 
90 Baker, supra note 57, at 586–87 &
tries with greater intranational competition have higher productivity); see also Gerla, 
a note 15, at 247 (endorsing Porter’s analysis). 
91 Porter, supra note 3, at 127. Porter 
fifth determinant,” but this is not ac
petition via its impacts on the four determinants. Id. at 126–27; see supra note 43 and 
accompanying text (listing the four determinants). 
92 Porter, supra note 3, at 627–30. 
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oil.93 In addition, tax law can affect demand conditions for different 
products and services. For instance, tax credits can increase domestic 
demand for new technologies, such as high-efficiency solar panels.94 
Furthermore, antitrust law can foster robust rivalry and shape company 
strategy.95 Like these other areas of law, patent law can affect competi-
tive advantage.96 In particular, U.S. patent law affects factor conditions 
and domestic rivalry in the United States. 
A. U.S. Patent Law and Factor Conditions 
 One way that U.S. patent law affects competitive advantage is by 
facilitating the creation of an important factor of production: informa-
tion.97 Significantly, patent law encourages the discovery of new infor-
mation by granting inventors exclusive but temporary rights to their 
discoveries.98 Patents also encourage the discovery of new information 
by publicizing information regarding new inventions. To obtain exclu-
sive patent rights, inventors must disclose sufficient information in 
their patents to enable a person of ordinary skill to use the protected 
invention.99 Patent-related disclosures may help subsequent researchers 
discover new inventions.100 
                                                                                                                      
93 Cf. id. at 640–44 (discussing the impact of policies on factor and currency markets). 
risa Long, 
Pate (arguing that a patent signals to sources 
of c
ation or licensing negotiations. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Igno-
ranc
 
94 See 26 U.S.C. § 25D(a)(1), (d)(2) (2006) (describing tax credits for “property which 
uses solar energy to generate electricity”). 
95 Porter, supra note 3, at 662–63. 
96 See Boldrin & Levine, supra note 1, at 43. In fact, at least one early version of mod-
ern patent law was designed to boost domestic factors of production by “attracting particu-
larly skillful artisans and merchants from other states.” See id. 
97 See supra notes 54–55, 76–82 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of 
information-sharing to competitive advantage). 
98 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)–(2) (2006 & Supp. VI 2012). Although patents encourage 
innovation, they also serve other purposes. Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1287, 1299 (re-
porting numerous reasons to obtain patent rights). For example, patents signal informa-
tion in a variety of contexts. William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 369, 393–
97 (2011) (arguing that patents serve as signals that support social norms); Cla
nt Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 647 (2002) 
apital that the patent owner engages in significant research and development). Ex-
panding defenses to patent infringement rather than raising the costs of obtaining patents 
may help to support these other benefits of patenting because the vast majority of patents 
are never asserted in litig
e at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1507, 1514 (2001) (arguing that some of 
the issues of patent law are most efficiently addressed by courts rather than by the Patent 
Office because only 5% of patents are asserted through litigation or licensing). 
99 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
100 Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 9–12 (2012). But see id. at 
13–15 (discussing criticisms of the disclosure function of patents). The value of this disclo-
1926 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1909 
 The factor-creation effect of U.S. patent law, however, may provide 
little competitive advantage to U.S. firms because U.S. patent law also 
improves factor conditions for foreign firms. To start, U.S. patents are 
public documents available to anyone with an Internet connection.101 
Moreover, the United States has joined international treaties that guar-
antee foreign inventors access to U.S. patent rights. For example, under 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”), the United States has agreed to “accord to the na-
tionals of other [signatories] treatment no less favorable than that it 
accords its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual 
property.”102 U.S. patent law thus serves as a factor-creation mechanism 
for both foreign and U.S. firms. 
 Despite this formal neutrality, the application of U.S. patent law 
oul
                                                                                                                     
c d favor U.S. firms for two reasons. First, firms from some countries, 
particularly developing countries, might face greater costs than U.S. 
inventors in discovering new inventions.103 For instance, highly edu-
cated workers are vital to innovation but may be rare in some coun-
 
tion, scope, maintenance and en-
forc
t 
inte te just one of many elements of economic growth and 
that factor conditions also play a role); Yu, supra note 13, at 988 (indicating that, at one 
poin
ty laws.”). 
sure is limited, however, to the extent that patents prevent competitors from improving 
upon an initial invention. 
101 See Search for Patents, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/ 
process/search/ (last modified Aug. 8, 2013, 11:08 AM) (providing a search engine for 
issued patents). In fact, most patent applications are published eighteen months after they 
are submitted to the U.S. Patent Office. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2006). 
102 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 3, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS] (citation omitted). TRIPS construes “protection” broadly 
as “includ[ing] matters affecting the availability, acquisi
ement of intellectual property rights.” Id. art. 3 n.3. Furthermore, under Article 27 of 
TRIPS, patent rights must be available “without discrimination as to the place of invention 
. . . and whether products are imported or locally produced.” Id. art. 27; see also Paris Conven-
tion for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 2, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at Stock-
holm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (“Nationals of any country [that has 
signed the treaty] shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all of the 
other countries [that have signed the treaty] the advantages that their respective laws now 
grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals . . . .”). 
103 See Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Devel-
oping Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 1115, 1116–17 (2009) (recognizing tha
llectual property rights constitu
t, more than 99% of the world’s stock of patents were owned by nationals of industri-
alized nations). As a result, countries where firms produce few new inventions have been 
reluctant to enact robust intellectual property laws. See Reichman, supra, at 1116–17 (“[I]n 
many countries, especially those at an early stage of development, a sound agricultural 
policy or sound pro-competitive industrial policy with a supportive political and legal infra-
structure are more likely to stimulate economic growth than intellectual proper
2013] The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents 1927 
tries.104 As a result, it may be difficult for firms from those countries to 
discover patentable inventions, and the factor-creation incentives from 
U.S. patent law would therefore favor U.S. firms.105 By analogy, a saw is 
a better factor-creation mechanism in a heavily forested country than in 
a country covered in grassy plains. Second, U.S. patent law may favor 
U.S. inventors if transaction costs, including language and cultural bar-
riers, prevent foreign inventors from successfully obtaining or enforc-
ing U.S. patents on their inventions.106 
 But even if the application of U.S. patent law sometimes favors U.S. 
firms regarding the creation of advanced factors of production, that ad-
vantage has waned for at least two reasons. First, by many measures, the 
innovative capacities of firms in many countries have grown in recent 
ar
astructure like high-speed Internet, tax rates, gross domes-
c p
 Second, numerous factors have reduced the transaction costs fac-
ing foreign firms seeking to acquire U.S. patents. For instance, millions 
of 
                                                            
ye s.107 For example, the Information Technology and Innovation 
Foundation recently released a study comparing the innovative capaci-
ties of forty different countries.108 The study considered sixteen factors 
to measure innovative capacity in each country, including the number 
of science and technology researchers, the amount of capital invested in 
research, the number of scholarly publications, the availability of tech-
nological infr
ti roduct per working-age adult, and worker productivity.109 The study 
concluded that the United States ranked fourth, behind Singapore, Fin-
land, and Sweden.110 Most alarming, however, was the study’s examina-
tion of investment in innovation in the past twelve years. In that multi-
factor comparison, the United States ranked thirty-ninth.111 
citizens of other countries have learned to speak English.112 Fur-
                                                          
, supra note 8, at 364–65. One example of how language barriers are prev-
alen ustrated by the recent patent infringement suit between Apple, Inc. and 
Samsung Electronics, Co., in which many of Samsung’s witnesses needed interpreters to 
help stimony. Dan Levine & Poornima Gupta, Analysis: How Apple Overwhelmed 
Sam  27, 2012, available at http://www.reuters. 
com
104 Porter, supra note 3, at 79. 
105 See id. at 76–80. 
106 Hubbard
t may be ill
 with their te
sung’s Patent Case Tactics, Reuters, Aug.
/article/2012/08/27/us-apple-samsung-legal-idUSBRE87Q02K20120827. 
107 See Hubbard, supra note 8, at 352 (collecting studies that suggest the United States 
is not out-innovating the rest of the world). 
108 Robert D. Atkinson & Scott M. Andes, The Info. Tech. & Innovation Found., 
The Atlantic Century II: Benchmarking EU and U.S. Innovation and Competitive-
ness 9 (2011). 
109 Id. at 5. 
110 Id. at 9. 
111 Id. at 11. 
112 Hubbard, supra note 8, at 365–66. 
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thermore, the United States has joined international treaties, like the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty, that allow foreign inventors to rely on for-
eign patents to streamline the process of obtaining patents in the Unit-
ed States.113 
 Consistent with these changes, foreign inventors have been acquir-
ing U.S. patents in steadily increasing percentages. In 1963, foreign in-
ventors accounted for just 18.6% of U.S. patents, but for the past three 
years, foreign inventors have obtained more than 50% of the patents 
issued by the U.S. Patent Office.114 In 2010 alone, foreign inventors ob-
tained 111,822 U.S. patents.115 To put this in perspective, if the U.S. 
Patent Office had only issued patents to foreign inventors in 2010, it 
would have nevertheless ranked third among patent offices in the 
world based on the number of issued patents.116 
 Unfortunately, it is difficult to reform U.S. patent law to improve 
factor creation by U.S. firms vis-à-vis foreign firms. In a previous article, 
this Author evaluated whether traditional improvements to U.S. patent 
law, like reducing the cost and duration of applying for a patent, would 
improve incentives to discover new inventions more for U.S. companies 
than for foreign co ges to U.S. patent 
w w
mpanies.117 If so, then these chan
la ould provide U.S. firms with competitive advantages by improving 
                                                                                                                      
113 See Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 3, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 
231 [hereinafter Patent Cooperation Treaty], available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/ 
texts/articles/atoc.htm. Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, foreign inventors can file a 
patent application in their home country’s patent office and then use that foreign applica-
tion
ark Off. A1-1 (Mar. 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/ 
top
er both “Year Range” tabs; then click the “Add All” but-
ton
he Power of 
Int
 to draft a U.S. patent application. Id. Nonetheless, transaction costs may remain high 
among less sophisticated foreign inventors. See Patenting by Organizations 2011, U.S. Pat. & 
Tradem
o_11.pdf (indicating that in 2011, 28% of individual inventors receiving U.S. patents 
were foreign, but 52% of corporations receiving U.S. patents were foreign). 
114 U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963–2012, supra note 9. 
115 Statistical Country Profiles: United States of America, World Intell. Prop. Org., http:// 
www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile/countries/us.html (last updated May 
2013). 
116 See IP Statistics Data Center, World Intell. Prop. Org., http://ipstatsdb.wipo. 
org/ipstatv2/ipstats/patentsSearch (last updated Mar. 2013) [hereinafter Total Count by 
Filing Office] (select “2 – Total patent grants (direct and PCT national phase entries)” 
under the “Indicator” tab; then select “Total count by filing office” under the “Report 
Type” tab; then select “2010” und
; then click the “Submit” button). Foreign patents also provide incentives to invent. See 
Michael A. Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing t
ellectual Property and Antitrust Law 3 (2009) (stating that patents have a “natu-
ral connection to innovation”). A competitiveness analysis of a country other than the 
United States might be different than the analysis provided in this Article and would be a 
fruitful topic for future research. 
117 See generally Hubbard, supra note 8 (analyzing the incentives produced by possible 
changes to U.S. patent law with respect to domestic and foreign inventors). 
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factor conditions for U.S. firms. I concluded, however, that these typical 
reforms would provide little competitive advantage to U.S. firms.118 Be-
cause the factor-creation aspects of U.S. patent law cannot be changed 
to increase U.S. competitive advantage, the remainder of this Part con-
siders the impact of U.S. patent law on a different determinant of com-
petitive advantage: domestic rivalry. 
B. Patents and General Competition 
 The relationships among patents, innovation, and competition are 
complex. Patents can support innovation by protecting investments in 
developing new technologies. They provide inventors with exclusive 
rights to make, use, offer to sell, sell, or import new inventions.119 As a 
result, patent owners can set the price of their goods or services high 
enough to profit meaningfully from their investments, and competitors 
cannot undercut their prices.120 Alternatively, inventors can recover the 
cos
                                                                      
t of developing a patented invention by licensing the patent.121 Fur-
thermore, because patents disclose substantial technological informa-
tion, patents can promote subsequent innovation.122 
 Unfortunately, the exclusive rights of patents also undermine 
competition,123 particularly where a patent covers technology essential 
to competition, such as the active ingredients in some pharmaceuti-
                                                
e than 
U.S.
to those reforms). This 
Aut
erbert Hovenkamp, 
Cre
s Papers on Econ. Activity 783, 788 (1987). 
118 Id. at 391 (asserting that such reforms could benefit foreign inventors mor
 inventors because more foreign inventors utilize the U.S. patent system than U.S. 
inventors and because foreign inventors may be more responsive 
hor also examined whether U.S. competitive advantage could be enhanced through 
protectionist patent laws and concluded that because patent law cannot (and should not) 
formally favor U.S. inventors, such measures would fail to achieve that goal. Id. 
119 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); Christina Bohannan & H
ation Without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Innovation, at xi 
(2012) (stating that protection for new inventions is essential to promote innovation); 
Baker, supra note 57, at 578 (noting that firms may not invest in innovation if competitors 
can obtain some of the benefits from that innovation); Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1283 
(“[P]atent monopoly is most commonly justified on the ground of providing incentives to 
innovate . . . .”). But see Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1283 (reporting that patents some-
times “serve as only slight to moderate incentives” to invent). 
120 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can 
Solve It 7–8 (2009) (“If we don’t do something to encourage invention by rewarding 
inventors, everyone will want to be an imitator, not an inventor.”). 
121 Hubbard, supra note 98, at 375. 
122 See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text (discussing this observation). 
123 See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Devel-
opment, 3 Brooking
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cals.124 Similarly, patents may be essential to an industry because they 
cover technology that is incorporated into industry standards.125 After 
being incorporated into an industry standard, competitors must use 
this patented technology even though alternate technologies were 
available before the industry standard was established.126 With an actual 
or threatened injunction prohibiting the infringement of a patent on 
an essential technology in an industry, the owner of the patent may be 
able to prevent another firm from effectively competing.127 Further-
more, even when the patent owner broadly licenses a patent on an es-
sential technology, competition may be undermined if the patent own-
er obtains royalties that significantly exceed the value of the patented 
technology.128 Such a license raises marginal costs for the patent own-
                                                                                                                      
124 See Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 119, at xv (contending that innovation of-
ten depends on shared access giving rise to competition); see also Boldrin & Levine, supra 
ote 
rules generally followed by most members of an industry. Compliance with standards is 
voluntary, to varying degrees . . . but it may be impossible to sell products not produced in 
acco
e-industry-standards.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). Industry standards 
cov
s.” See Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Patents, and the National Smart Grid, 32 
Pac
 Law Dictionary 851 
(9th
1, at 1263, 1318 (reporting that entrepreneurs some-
tim
 technologies and identifying difficulties in 
accu times, a technology is essential to an industry 
bec
n 1, at 8 (observing that drugs cost five to ten times as much when they are patented as 
when the patent expires and generic competitors enter the market). 
125 Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 Ca-
lif. L. Rev. 1889, 1892–93, 1946 (2002). Industry standards are “procedural and technical 
rdance with a standard.” What Are Industry Standards?, wiseGEEK, http://www.wise 
geek.com/what-ar
er a wide variety of products, including mobile phones and personal computers. Lem-
ley, supra, at 1896. Patents on such products are often described as “standards essential 
patents” or “SEP
e L. Rev. 641, 655 (2012). By definition, firms in a standards-based industry cannot 
avoid infringing standards-essential patents. Because of the competitive problems that can 
arise with industry standards, many standard-setting organizations seek to use private 
agreements to limit the capacity of patent owners to undermine competition. See Lemley, 
supra, at 1948–54. 
126 See Boldrin & Levine, supra note 1, at 86. Changing established standards is ex-
pensive. Id. at 87. 
127 Burk & Lemley, supra note 120, at 29. Patent infringement is “[a]n act that inter-
feres with one of the exclusive rights of a patent . . . owner.” Black’s
 ed. 2009). 
128 See Graham et al., supra note 
es license patents “solely to avoid a lawsuit”). Determining the value of a patented 
technology is difficult. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How 
Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 95–119 (2009) (exploring 
various ways to measure the value of patented
rately conducting such measures). Some
ause the technology is an important pioneering discovery. Paying high royalties for 
such a patent may not undermine competition because those royalties provide incentives 
for firms to develop new technologies that can be used to compete. 
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er’s competitors and may foster intrafirm inefficiencies for the patent 
owner, including underinvestment in future innovations.129 
 Finally, even patents on technologies that are not central to an in-
dustry—and which thus protect only one way of competing—can affect 
rivalry because they may raise costs for competitors who accidentally 
infringe the patents.130 For example, one firm may invest substantial 
resources in developing a technology only to learn later that the tech-
nology infringes a rival’s patent. Because independent invention is not 
a defense to patent infringement,131 the infringing firm may consider 
switching to a different technology to avoid patent liability.132 
 Even when non-infringing alternatives are technologically possible, 
risk-averse firm that closely examines a patent 
       
however, switching technologies may be unfeasible for two reasons. 
First, the costs of switching to a different technology may be substantial. 
Developing a non-infringing alternative may be expensive.133 Even 
when alternative technologies are cheaply available, the cost of altering 
production facilities and distribution chains to implement the non-
infringing alternative may be enormous.134 Second, a firm might avoid 
infringing one patent only to infringe another. Many corporations to-
day own massive patent portfolios,135 and determining ex ante whether 
a product infringes any patent in that portfolio may be difficult, par-
ticularly because precise patent boundaries can be notoriously un-
clear.136 Even worse, a 
                                                                                                               
pra notes 60–64 and accompanying text 
(dis
pra note 119, at xv; see also Graham et 
al., 
 substitute to patented technology). 
nty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: 
The , 209 
(200 r appellate court’s claim construc-
tion
129 See Gerla, supra note 15, at 238–39; see su
cussing intrafirm inefficiencies). 
130 Such patents are common. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 
42–43 & n.4 (2006); Bohannan & Hovenkamp, su
supra note 1, at 1313 (indicating that competitors may try to invent around patents); 
Levin et al., supra note 123, at 802–03 (same). 
131 Burk & Lemley, supra note 120, at 8. 
132 See generally Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for 
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1661 (discussing reasonable royalty 
damages when there is an acceptable
133 See id. at 1718–23 (discussing the costs of developing non-infringing alternatives). 
134 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 120, at 29. 
135 See Patenting by Organizations 2011, supra note 113, at B1-1 (noting that in 2011 
alone, Samsung Electronics Co. obtained 4868 U.S. patents). Interestingly, Apple, Inc. 
obtained only 676 U.S. patents in 2011. Id. at B1-2. 
136 See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertai
Time Is Right for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. Intell Prop. L. 175
1) (“The patent litigator cannot predict the trial o
 with any certainty or confidence.”); Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 
Mich. L. Rev. 523, 525 (2010) (“The normal story of patent law’s boundary problems is 
that claim language is too vague.”). 
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an later infringes it may be found to have willfully infringed the pat-
ent, thereby risking treble damages and attorney’s fees.
d 
cense, a firm faces switching costs and potential liability for both past 
obs
137 
 In the end, paying royalties for a license to a competitor’s patents 
may be cheaper even if the patent owner can charge royalties that ex-
ceed the value of the patented technology.138 In the absence of a li-
and future patent infringement. By raising marginal costs, however, 
such a license may inhibit competition.139 As Justice Anthony Kennedy 
erved in the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court patent case eBay Inc. v. Mer-
cExchange, L.L.C., a patent owner may use an injunction and the “po-
tentially serious sanctions arising from its violation . . . as a bargaining 
tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to 
practice the patent.”140 
 When patents undermine competition, they not only impose costs 
on society, but may also retard innovation.141 For example, because in-
                                                                                                                      
137 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (establishing treble damages, which mul-
tiply compensatory damages up to three times); Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual 
Property in the New Technological Age 421 (6th ed. 2012) (explaining that the will-
fulness doctrine may disincentivize inventors from reading competitors’ patents); see also In 
re Seagate Tech., LLC 497 F.3d 1360, 1370–72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (discussing the 
legal standard for willful patent infringement). 
138 See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (discussing royalty payments). 
139 See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text. 
140 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). This concern may have been 
ameliorated to a certain extent by the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, which held patent 
owners are not automatically entitled to injunctive relief when their patents are infringed. 
Id. at 391–94 (majority opinion). Even after eBay, however, courts may frequently enjoin 
infringement. See id. at 394–95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
141 Gerla, supra note 15, at 228–33; Levin et al., supra note 123, at 787–88; Reichman, 
supra note 103, at 1121. Scholars disagree sharply regarding the relationship between 
competition and innovation. See, e.g., Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 119, at 9 (not-
ing that “there is probably more empirical literature on the relation between competition 
and innovation than on any topic in the field of industrial organization economics”). 
Prominent economist Joseph Schumpeter famously argued that rivalry actually under-
min
 
es innovation. Id. at 8; Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 
81–106 (3d ed. 1946); Baker, supra note 57, at 578. Rivalry, for example, causes duplicative 
effort. Moreover, firms may be reluctant to invest in projects that will convey significant 
benefits to rivals, like basic scientific research. See Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 
119, at 8. Economic conditions in some industries also may favor monopolies because of 
the benefits of economies of scale. For example, smaller firms find it difficult to compete 
in the pharmaceutical industry because the cost of developing a new drug may be as high 
as $800 million. See Boldrin & Levine, supra note 1, at 212. In contrast to Schumpeter’s 
position, well-known scholars like Kenneth Arrow have argued that competition instead 
provides significant incentives to innovate. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allo-
cation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Economic Activities: 
Economic and Social Factors 609 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962); Baker, supra note 57, at 
578–79; Gerla, supra note 15, at 230 (“The empirical data indicates that it is more danger-
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dependent invention is not a defense to patent infringement, patents 
can deter competitors from investing in innovation in patent-rich 
fields.142 Patents also prevent competitors from improving upon a pat-
ented invention, and some improvements could be quite significant.143 
Moreover, patent owners often face little pressure to make improve-
ments to their patented inventions. For example, “[a] monopolist 
could spend a great deal of money to make a dramatic improvement— 
whether by lowering cost, improving quality, or creating a new prod-
uct—only to find that it does not get much additional business because 
it already has most of the business there is to get.”144 Indeed, “there are 
many instances when a firm that thought it had control over a broad 
technology rested on its laurels until jogged to action by an outside 
                                                                                                                      
ous for innovation if we err on the side of too little rivalry than if we err on the side of too 
much rivalry.”); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 908 (1990). This Article does not attempt to resolve this de-
bate, nor does this Article depend on a particular resolution to it. The primary focus of 
this Article is the effect of rivalry on global competition, and numerous empirical studies 
have demonstrated that domestic rivalry is critical to competitive advantage. Baker, supra 
note 57, at 585–86 & n.29 (collecting studies). For example, Michael Porter’s empirical 
study of competition in global markets “casts grave doubts” on the claim that monopoly 
fosters competitive advantage. See Porter, supra note 3, at 117 (“A look at the successful 
industries in the ten nations we studied . . . belie[s] the simple notion that world leader-
ship grows out of one or two firms who reap economies of scale in the home market.”). 
142 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 120, at 8. At the same time, an overabundance of 
patents can force competitors to engage in defensive patenting. For example, one com-
petitor might obtain patents solely to be able to assert them in retaliation to patent claims 
by another competitor. See Julie Samuels, The Defensive Patent License and Other Ways to Beat 
tent-license-and-other-ways-beat-patent-system (defining defensive 
pate igation” and explaining that “the practice 
has atents for anything and everything, which—thanks to 
an 
o About It 59–60 (2004); see also Black’s 
Law
e licenses for their mutual benefit and use of the 
licen
the Patent System, Elec. Frontier Found. ( June 10, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2012/06/defensive-pa
nting as “acquiring patents to deter future lit
encouraged companies to seek p
overburdened Patent Office—has resulted in a generation of overbroad patents”). 
Overabundant patents can also lead to cross-licensing. Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, In-
novation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering 
Innovation and Progress, and What to D
 Dictionary, supra note 127, at 1003 (stating that cross-licensing occurs when “two or 
more [patent owners agree] to exchang
sed products”). 
143 Merges & Nelson, supra note 141, at 870. 
144 Baker, supra note 57, at 578. 
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threat.”145 Competition thus can help to speed the development of im-
provements of existing technology.146 
 Because patents both encourage invention and undermine com-
petition, lawmakers must carefully tailor patent rights to balance these 
competing conce  to patents is 
iti
the y, the intersection between marginal cost and marginal benefit 
 they cannot be measured empirically.151 
rns.147 The scope of protection afforded
cr cal to achieving this balance. Patent scope depends on numerous 
factors, including the duration of patents; the types of discoveries eligi-
ble for patent protection; the breadth of judicial interpretation of the 
language in patents; the bases on which patents can be invalidated; and 
the remedies awarded for patent infringement.148 Increasing the scope 
of protection—by, for example, substantially extending the duration of 
patents—might provide greater incentives to innovate, but would prob-
ably obstruct follow-on innovation and inhibit competition to a greater 
extent. The social utility of a potential change in patent scope thus will 
depend on the marginal costs and benefits of the change.149 At least in 
or
curves determines the optimal level of patent protection.150 Unfortu-
nately, rigorously comparing these marginal costs and benefits is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, because
                                                                                                                      
145 Merges & Nelson, supra note 141, at 872. Another way in which patents may reduce 
the incentive to innovate for patent owners is because “rivalry may promote the elimina-
tion o tions 
they c
146 have 
impro
147  help 
in thi rtion 
of law (Fed. 
Cir. 20
148 See generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 141 (evaluating doctrines of patent scope). 
titrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1813, 
182
 
f internal inefficiencies which hinder the ability of firms to profit from innova
reate.” Gerla, supra note 15, at 229–30. 
 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 141, at 878 (noting that “society prefers to 
vements now rather than later”). 
 Burk & Lemley, supra note 120, at 8. Other areas of law provide only limited
s balancing. For example, antitrust liability typically does not extend to the asse
fully acquired patent rights. Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 
07). 
149 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-An
29 (1984). 5 n.
150 See generally Tim Worstall, The Tabarrok Curve: Why the Patent System Is Not Fit for Pur-
pose, Forbes (June 23, 2013, 9:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/ 
06/23/the-tabarrok-curve-why-the-patent-system-is-not-fit-for-purpose/ (embracing a cost-
benefit analysis of patent protection). 
151 See Fritz Malchup, Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., Study No. 15, An Economic Review of 
the Patent System 80 (Comm. Print 1958). Economist Fritz Malchup famously con-
cluded his study of the U.S. patent system unsure of its social utility: 
If one does not know whether a system “as a whole” (in contrast to certain 
features of it) is good or bad, the safest “policy conclusion” is to “muddle 
through” —either with it, if one has long lived with it, or without it, if one has 
lived without it. If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, 
on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to rec-
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C. U.S. Patents and Competition by U.S. Firms 
 A U.S. patent prevents competitors from making, using, selling, 
offering to sell, and importing infringing technology in the United 
States.152 As a result, U.S. patents not only restrict the commercial ac-
tivities of U.S.-headquartered firms, which conduct many of their activi-
ties in the United States, but also restrict competition by firms founded 
abroad that conduct business in the United States.153 Nevertheless, be-
cause of limits on the extraterritoriality of U.S. law, much of the com-
mercial activity conducted by foreign firms occurs beyond the reach of 
U.S. patent law.154 U.S. patents, therefore, do not impact foreign firms 
as much as they affect U.S. firms, and U.S. patents consequently un-
dermine U.S. competitive advantage in two respects. 
 First, U.S. patents limit competition by U.S. firms in global mar-
kets. Often, foreign firms can cheaply avoid liability for infringing a 
U.S. patent simply by performing certain commercial activities outside 
of the United States, and U.S. firms face comparatively greater costs in 
conducting commercial activities outside the United States. For exam-
ple, a Chinese firm could avoid infringing a U.S. patent by manufactur-
ing and selling its products outside of the United States. For a U.S. 
company to similarly sidestep a U.S. patent, it would need to establish 
                                                                                                                      
ommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long 
time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to rec-
153 See Bessen & Muerer, supra note 128, at 140 (noting that “a lawsuit filed in the 
United States might result in a settlement that covers worldwide business”). 
154 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) (holding that 
.S. patent law may affect conduct in foreign jurisdictions when foreign activities 
have
tes). Even in this situation, however, a successful patent owner may not be 
able
reign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 53, 
75 (
ommend abolishing it. 
Id. 
152 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
under U.S. patent law “it is not an infringement to make or use a patented product outside 
of the United States”); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (“Section 271(a) [of Title 35] is only actionable against patent infringement that 
occurs within the United States.”). Although U.S. patent law generally lacks extraterritorial 
effect, U
 a sufficient nexus with the United States. For example, if a foreign firm imports a 
product into the United States that was produced by a patented process, that firm may be 
liable for patent infringement even if the process was used entirely outside of the United 
States. 35 U.S.C § 271(g); see also NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317 (holding that, even if part of a 
patented system is located outside of the United States, the system is “used” in the United 
States if “control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of the system obtained” in 
the United Sta
 to assert a U.S. patent infringement judgment against a firm’s foreign assets. See Rob-
ert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Fo
1984) (indicating that foreign jurisdictions may not give U.S. judgments preclusive 
effect). 
1936 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1909 
or enlarge its commercial presence outside of the United States, there-
by raising costs for the U.S. firm and reducing the extent to which the 
firm contributes to the U.S. economy.155 
ared to com-
ete
                                                                                                                     
 Second, by restricting the commercial activities of U.S. firms, U.S. 
patents inhibit competition among U.S. firms. In limited respects, U.S. 
patents can affect rivalry among foreign firms, at least to the extent that 
foreign firms compete with each other for sales in the United States. A 
U.S. patent owned by one Japanese company, for instance, could limit 
the ability of another Japanese company to compete for U.S. sales. 
Nevertheless, U.S. patents affect rivalry among foreign firms less in 
their home countries because central aspects of their businesses take 
place beyond the reach of U.S. patent law.156 With less domestic rivalry 
to hone their competitive edges, U.S. firms are less prep
p  in global markets.157 
 To some extent, foreign patents limit competition by and among 
foreign firms as well. Indeed, important inventions are often patented 
in many countries.158 Nevertheless, in two respects U.S. patents reduce 
U.S. competitiveness more than foreign patents limit foreign competi-
tiveness. 
 First, the extent to which a patent limits domestic rivalry in a coun-
try depends upon the scope of protection afforded to patents in that 
country, and U.S. patent law generally provides broader rights than 
many foreign patent systems.159 Other countries typically have been 
 
an 
com
ntage). 
r countries. See Patent Co-
ope ntell. Prop. Org., 
http
 As described in more detail below, the scope of patent protection in 
the United States has increased in many ways in recent years. See infra notes 200–206 and 
acco
155 The Wright brothers’ U.S. patent on basic airplane technology may provide an ex-
ample of this phenomenon. Some commentators have argued that the Wright brothers’ 
aggressive assertion of their U.S. patent allowed for the development of the aviation indus-
try in France. Boldrin & Levine, supra note 1, at 87–88; see also id. at 219 (asserting that 
“the slow growth of the coloring industry in the United States before the First World War 
was largely due to patent protection: most [U.S.] patents were held by the large Germ
panies”). 
156 See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the limited reach of U.S. pat-
ent law on foreign corporations). 
157 See supra notes 68–90 and accompanying text (illustrating how domestic rivalry fos-
ters competitive adva
158 In fact, the United States (along with more than 140 other countries) has signed 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty, which allows an inventor to use a patent application in one 
country to streamline the patent application processes in othe
ration Treaty, supra note 103, art. 3; Contracting Parties, World I
://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=6 (last visited Nov. 
17, 2013) (check the “Patent Cooperation Treaty” box; then click the “Search” button). 
159 Some research indicates that “the level of intellectual property protection increases 
with a country’s real gross domestic product per capita.” Council of Econ. Advisers, 
supra note 4, at 225.
mpanying text. 
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more reluctant to expand the rights of patent owners, so that “[m]ost 
indices of the strength of intellectual property protection tend to show 
that the United States is among the countries with the highest level of 
protection.”160 Consequently, even if the same technology is protected 
by patents in both the United States and foreign jurisdictions, the harm 
to competition is more pronounced in the United States. 
 Second, foreign inventions are protected by patents in the United 
St s—all things being equal—more than in many other countries.ate
ents across all patent offices worldwide.165 Nonresident patenting in 
some patent-intensive countries is much lower than this global average. 
For
161 
Because the United States is the largest consumer market in the world 
and because only U.S. patents can be asserted in this market, many for-
eign firms highly value U.S. patents.162 Moreover, as described above, 
the transaction costs for a foreign inventor to obtain a U.S. patent have 
recently decreased.163 As a result of the value and increasing ease of 
obtaining U.S. patents, foreign inventors have been obtaining U.S. pat-
ents in record numbers.164 In contrast, inventors worldwide are not 
flocking to many other countries. Excluding patenting in the United 
States, nonresident inventors in 2010 accounted for only 36% of pat-
 instance, in 2010 nonresident inventors obtained only 16% of Jap-
anese patents and only 25% of Korean patents.166 Similarly, in 2011, 
                                                                                                                      
160 Council of Econ. Advisers, supra note 4, at 225; see also Kapczynski, supra note 7, 
1588–1616 (demonstrating that patent protections in India are weaker than protections in 
the 
then
n Union is a mas-
sive ing patents 
from
 market); David 
 
United States, particularly for pharmaceutical inventions). 
161 See U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963–2012, supra note 9. 
162 See id. (showing that the U.S. Patent Office has issued more patents to foreigners 
than to U.S. residents in recent years); see also Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 889–90 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that foreign patents cannot be asserted in the United States); 
World Top Consumer Markets Ranking, supra note 9 (ranking the United States as the top 
consumer market). 
163 See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text. 
164 See U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963–2012, supra note 9. 
165 See IP Statistics Data Center, supra note 116 [hereinafter Total Count by Applicant’s 
Origin and Filing Office] (select “2 – Total patent grants (direct and PCT national phase 
entries)” under the “Indicator” tab; then select “Count by applicant’s origin and by filing 
office” under the “Report Type” tab; then select “2010” under both “Year Range” tabs; 
then click the “Add All” button under both “Select Origin” and “Select Office” categories; 
 click the “Submit” button). 
166 Id. The only other major patent office that issues close to 50% of its patents to for-
eign inventors is the European Patent Office. Id. The reason for this high rate of foreign 
inventor patenting is likely similar to the U.S. explanation: the Europea
 consumer market, and there are few barriers to foreign inventors obtain
 the European Patent Office. See Deloitte, Consumer 2020: Reading the Signs 7 
(2011), https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Global/Local%20Assets/Documents/ 
Consumer%20Business/8664A_Consumer2020_sg8.pdf (massive consumer
1938 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1909 
79% of the patent applications received by the State Intellectual Prop-
erty Office of the People’s Republic of China came from residents.167 
e than three times the number of patents that the Euro-
pean Patent Office issued that year.168 Nevertheless, patents issued to 
r
nt
 Despite the low percentage of nonresident patentees, some for-
eign countries issue large numbers of patents to resident inventors. 
These patents can limit competition by and among firms in those coun-
tries, thereby reducing their competitive advantage. For example, in 
2010, Japan issued 187,237 Japanese patents to Japanese inventors, 
which is mor
esidents also arguably bolster competitive advantage by providing resi-
de s with exclusive rights to discoveries in that country.169 In contrast, 
when the U.S. Patent Office issues a U.S. patent to a foreign inventor, 
competition by and among U.S. firms is limited even though U.S. firms 
may not obtain exclusive access to the new invention. 
 Thus, with more foreign inventors obtaining U.S. patents and with 
U.S. patent law providing more robust rights than many foreign patent 
laws, U.S. patents limit competition more in the United States than for-
eign patents limit competition in other countries. This reduced compe-
tition in the United States ultimately undermines U.S. competitive ad-
vantage. 
D. Current Approaches to U.S. Patent Law and U.S. Competitive Advantage 
 Policymakers recognize that enhancing U.S. competitiveness is 
important and that patent law can affect competitive advantage.170 Be-
                                                                                                                      
Meyer, ‘Troll’ Warning as EU Gets Unitary Patent Scheme, After Decades of Failure, ZDNet (Dec. 
20, 2012, 9:36 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/troll-warning-as-eu-gets-unitary-patent-scheme-
after
 foreign inventor may also be able to use a foreign patent to obtain patent rights 
in o pera-
tion
[sic]”); 153 Cong. Rec. 23706 (2007) (arguing that legislation resulting in 
wea
e strongest 
 
-decades-of-failure-7000008672/ (arguing that new European Union rules will make it 
too easy to obtain an EU patent); see also Jerzy Koopman, The Patentability of Transgenic An-
imals in the United States of America and the European Union: A Proposal for Harmonization, 13 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 103, 200 (2002) (stating that patents on trans-
genic animals can be obtained in a way that such patents in the United States cannot). 
167 Daniel Pruzin, Bloomberg Law, U.N. Agency Says China Top Recipient for Patent, 
Trademark, Design Applications, Trademark & Copyright L. Daily, Dec. 12, 2012, at 1, 1–2. 
The term “resident filers” includes “Chinese firms as well as foreign firms with an estab-
lished presence in China through which the applications were filed.” Id. 
168 Total Count by Applicant’s Origin and Filing Office, supra note 165. 
169 A
ther countries under the Patent Cooperation Treaty noted above. See Patent Coo
 Treaty, supra note 113, art. 3; supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
170 See 157 Cong. Rec. S5433 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Mark Kirk) 
(stating that legislation that “strengthen[s] our patent system . . . [will] bolster our global 
competiveness 
ker patent protection “is a severe threat to American innovation, American jobs and 
American competitiveness”); 143 Cong. Rec. 4359 (1997) (“[W]e have had th
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cause policymakers have misunderstood the impact of U.S. patents on 
U.S. competitive advantage, however, they have sought to increase U.S. 
competitiveness through two fundamentally flawed approaches. 
 First, lawmakers have sought to increase U.S. competitive advan-
tage by strengthening the protections offered by U.S. patents and thus 
 The second approach traditionally adopted by U.S. lawmakers at-
tem  
 
U.S ization.”176 Many lawmakers 
(it is hoped) increasing incentives for U.S. firms to discover new inven-
tions.171 As discussed above, however, foreign inventors frequently ob-
tain U.S. patents, and enlarged incentives created through stronger 
U.S. patents generally will inure to the benefit of both domestic and 
foreign firms.172 In fact, because stronger patent rights are more valu-
able, strengthening U.S. patent rights will encourage more foreign 
firms to obtain U.S. patents.173 Unlike the benefits of stronger U.S. pat-
ent rights, the competitive harms of stronger U.S. patents dispropor-
tionately impact U.S. firms.174 As a result, increasing the strength of 
U.S. patent protection may eventually harm competition by and among 
U.S. firms such that U.S. competitiveness will decrease. This Article ar-
gues below, in Part III, that U.S. patent law has already passed this tip-
ping point.175 
pting to use patent law to increase U.S. competitiveness is to
strengthen foreign patent law to match the protections provided by
. patent law—so called “upward harmon
and businesses believe that strengthening patent law in foreign coun-
                                                                                                                      
patent protection of any country of the world, and that is what has ensured the American 
peo
etitive-
ness
ple for these last 200 years the ability to have a higher standard of living than other 
countries of the world, because we were able to out-compete them.”); 131 Cong. Rec. 
21739 (1985) (stating that “strengthening intellectual property rights was cited as a major 
prescription for ensuring America’s continued prosperity and economic comp
”). 
171 See supra note 170 and accompanying text (collecting congressional records). 
172 See supra notes 159–169 and accompanying text; see also Thomas H. Case & Scott R. 
Miller, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 57 S. Cal. L Rev. 301, 322 
(1984) (“American patents that are issued to foreigners benefit the inventor regardless of 
nationality.”). 
173 See Augustine, supra note 35, at 61. All things being equal, patents in a smaller 
economy are generally less valuable because they impact less economic activity. 
174 See supra notes 152–169 and accompanying text (describing the unique harms suf-
fered by U.S. firms pursuant to strong U.S. patent laws). 
175 See infra notes 198–216 and accompanying text. 
176 S. Rep. No. 104-394, at 6 (1996) (“For more than a decade, a major objective of 
U.S. international trade negotiations has been strengthening intellectual property protec-
tions worldwide.”); see also Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1571. Harmonization, more gener-
ally, has been defined as “the adoption of standards or agreements that bring state prac-
tices closer to one another.” Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1572 n.4. 
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tries “will be critically important to the success of [U.S.] firms and the 
American economy.”177 To this end, the United States has been a major 
proponent of international treaties that require signatories to provide 
robust patent protection.178 For example, the United States was a driv-
ing force behind TRIPS, which established minimum levels of intellec-
tual property protection in all countries that are members of the World 
radT e Organization (WTO).179 To ensure compliance with TRIPS, the 
United States has initiated WTO dispute resolution proceedings, in-
cluding actions against Brazil180 and China.181 In fact, the United States 
has initiated numerous dispute resolution proceedings under TRIPS— 
more than all of the other WTO member countries combined.182 Fur-
thermore, to strengthen the protection of intellectual property beyond 
                                                                                                                      
177 Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 Campbell L. 
Rev. 525, 549 (2012); accord Boldrin & Levine, supra note 1, at 174, 246. Peter Yu notes 
that the United States is “one of the predominant intellectual property powers pushing for
stronger levels of protection and enforce
 
1
2012, at 1, 1–2 (quoting Rep. Robert W. Goodlatte). 
179 John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 
685
to be an 
esse
ing international intellectual property standards). 
 
al Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2007); see also Peter 
K. Y  Enforcement, 5 Occasional Papers in Intell. 
Pro
=A26#selected_ 
agre
w regarding inventions 
mad
ment around the world.” Yu, supra, at 541. 
78 For example, in 2012, the chair of the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Prop-
erty, Competition, and the Internet stated that the United States should use negotiations 
with numerous Asian countries to generate “stronger, not weaker commitments by other 
countries to enhance their IP laws.” Tamlin H. Bason, Bloomberg Law, House Subcommittee 
Questions IP Czar on Trade Secret Theft, Counterfeit Drugs, Daily Rep. for Execs., Sept. 24, 
, 695–96 (2002); Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1579; Yu, supra note 177, at 541; see S. Rep. 
No. 104-394, at 6 (“During the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, the United 
States persistently sought to include international protection of intellectual property as an 
element of free trade. This was at the top of our trade agenda and was considered 
ntial ingredient for a successful agreement.”); 140 Cong. Rec. 29660 (1994) (asserting 
that TRIPS “save[s] us billions with stronger intellectual property rights which will protect 
our most competitive industries”); 140 Cong. Rec. 12573 (1994) (arguing that TRIPS is 
“of great importance to our Nation’s global competitiveness and innovative strength”). See 
generally TRIPS, supra note 102 (establish
180 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil—Measures Af-
fecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/3 ( Jan. 9, 2001). After the WTO constituted a panel to
resolve the issue, the United States and Brazil settled. Notification of Mutually Agreed 
Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4 ( July 19, 2001). 
181 Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting the Protec-
tion and Enforcement of Intellectu
u, The U.S.-China Dispute over TRIPS
p. L. 1, 20, 23 (2010) (reporting that the United States did not prevail on many of its 
claims in its dispute with China). 
182 Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, Disputes by Agreement, World Trade Org., http:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id
ement (last visited Aug. 19, 2013). The United States has also been the target of patent-
related WTO proceedings. See, e.g., Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States—US 
Patents Code, WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7, 2001) (challenging U.S. patent la
e with federal assistance). 
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the minimum provided by TRIPS, the United States has also pursued 
additional treaties with its trade partners.183 
 In addition to the campaign to strengthen intellectual property 
rights generally, the United States has also embarked on a campaign “to 
strengthen [the] enforcement of intellectual property rights internation-
ally.”184 Under the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Attaché Program, 
the U.S. Patent Office stations representatives of the U.S. Patent Office 
in countries around the world and charges these attachés with “en-
courag[ing] strong IPR protection and enforcement by U.S. trading 
partners for the benefit of U.S. rights holders.”185 Similarly, in 2011, the 
FBI placed an agent in Beijing, China to help quell intellectual prop-
erty crime.186 The United States has also helped to train patent exam-
iners in foreign jurisdictions.187 
 Strengthening the scope and enforcement of foreign patent law 
might in some respects increase the competitive advantage of U.S. 
firms by allowing U.S. firms to better exploit differences in advanced 
factors of production (e.g., inventions) and by equalizing the competi-
tive conditions for foreign and U.S. firms. Many foreign countries, 
however, have been reluctant to change their laws. For example, the 
negotiations that ultimately produced TRIPS were “highly conten-
tious.”188 As a result, although TRIPS established minimum levels of 
patent protection, the treaty nevertheless allows countries to adopt pat-
ent protections much weaker than those in the United States.189 Efforts 
by 
f resistance. For example, the 
Un ew and higher benchmark for inter-
     
the United States to negotiate additional treaties that strengthen 
foreign patent law have often met stif
ited States attempted to “set a n
national intellectual property enforcement” through a multilateral trea-
ty entitled the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”).190 
                                                                                                                 
183 Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1640. 
184 Office of the President, 2010 Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Prop-
ert
: Hearing 
Befo
y Enforcement 14 (2010) (emphasis added). 
185 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Attaché Program, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. ( July 
30, 2013, 3:24 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/attache/index.jsp. 
186 International IP Enforcement: Opening Markets Abroad and Protecting Innovation
re the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 14 (2012) (statement of Victoria A. Espinel). 
187 Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1624. 
188 Yu, supra note 13, at 980; see also Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1580–81 (describing 
opposition to TRIPS by developing countries). 
189 See Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1643. 
190 Peter K. Yu, Of ACTA/TPP and SOPA/PIPA, 7 Occasional Papers in Intell. Prop. 
L. 1, 3 (2012). 
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C d 
eventually sparked protests worldwide.191 
 The reasons t embrace more 
rin
atents described 
above: U.S. patents provide incentives to innovate for both foreign and 
                                                                                                                     
oncerns that ACTA’s protection of intellectual property overreache
 that many foreign jurisdictions do no
st gent patent protection are complex, but one reason may be that 
the economies of these countries are better served by patent laws that 
focus more on encouraging competition than on providing incentives 
to invent.192 Indeed, foreign jurisdictions are more likely to focus on 
competition in their patent laws because U.S. patents provide foreign 
inventors with significant incentives to invent.193 Strong U.S. patent law 
thus undermines incentives for foreign jurisdictions to strengthen for-
eign patent laws.194 
III. Weakening U.S. Patents to Increase U.S. Competitiveness 
A. Effects of Weakening U.S. Patent Law 
 Weakening U.S. patent protection can increase U.S. competitive 
advantage by addressing the asymmetry in U.S. p
 
191 David Jolly, Intellectual Property Pact Draws Fire in Europe, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2012, at 
couraging foreign countries to strengthen their patent laws 
wou
sts like language barriers may be one reason that 
U.S.
. inventors by subsidizing the cost of applying for foreign 
pate
rce foreign patents if the costs of doing so exceed the expected 
ben
). 
B5. Following this public opposition, the European Parliament rejected the treaty. Pfanner, 
supra note 13. 
192 See Yu, supra note 13, at 980 (noting that “the perspectives of developed and less-
developed countries on the role of intellectual property protection and enforcement re-
main far apart”). 
193 Compare Burk & Lemley, supra note 120, at 8 (indicating that patents can incentiv-
ize innovation but can also constrain competition), with Hubbard, supra note 8, at 356--58 
(chronicling the movement away from protectionism in U.S. patent law and recognizing 
that the trend has tended to harmonize U.S. and foreign incentives to innovate). 
194 One alternative to en
ld be to increase the rate at which U.S. inventors obtain foreign patents. If more U.S. 
inventors obtained and enforced foreign patents, rivalry in the countries issuing those 
patents might decline. Transaction co
 inventors infrequently obtain foreign patents. The United States could encourage 
such foreign patenting by U.S
nts, as some countries already do for their inventors. See Tony Dutra, Bloomberg Law, 
PTO Reports on Small Business International Rejects Taxpayer-Funded Options, Pat., Trademark, 
& Copyright J., Sept. 20, 2013, at 30, 30–31. Even if more U.S. inventors obtained more 
patents in foreign jurisdictions, however, they may not enforce them. Attempting to en-
force patents in jurisdictions with weak patent laws may provide little return for the patent 
owners. Moreover, even when enforcement could provide meaningful relief, patent litiga-
tion is very expensive, particularly if that litigation is conducted in a foreign country, and 
U.S. inventors will not enfo
efits. Indeed, enforcement issues are a major reason that inventors often do not seek 
patent protection for their discoveries. Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1310; see Levin et al., 
supra note 123, at 803 (reporting that lack of enforcement by firms is perceived to weaken 
the effectiveness of patents
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U  firms, but harm U.S. competition more than foreign competi-
tion.
.S.
patents while simultaneously underestimating the costs, U.S. lawmakers 
like rotection in the United States 
abo
195 As a result, weakening U.S. patents would increase competition 
among U.S. firms more than among foreign firms, and this differential 
would in this respect help U.S. firms compete more effectively against 
foreign rivals. But weakening U.S. patent protection will also reduce 
incentives to invent.196 Thus, to maximize U.S. competitiveness, U.S. 
lawmakers should seek to establish an optimum level of patent protec-
tion in the United States that will efficiently balance all costs and bene-
fits, including those related to competitive advantage.197 Unfortunately, 
determining this optimal level is difficult because empirical obstacles 
prevent rigorous comparisons of costs and benefits.198 
 Despite these empirical challenges, it is likely that U.S. patent pro-
tection currently exceeds optimal levels. Policymakers have overstated 
the extent to which U.S. patents foster U.S. competitiveness by touting 
the factor-creation effects of U.S. patents for U.S. firms while ignoring 
the incentives to invent that U.S. patents provide to foreign firms. At the 
same time, lawmakers have not recognized that the disproportionate 
harm U.S. patents cause to domestic rivalry in the United States un-
dermines U.S. competitiveness. By overestimating the benefits of U.S. 
ly have established a level of patent p
ve the level that would maximize U.S. competitive advantage.199 
 Indeed, for decades, U.S. lawmakers have strengthened patent 
protection in the United States, arguing that such changes would in-
                                                                                                                      
195 See supra notes 159–169 and accompanying text (illustrating this disparity). Patents 
can be weakened either by reducing the scope of protection afforded to U.S. patents or by 
making U.S. patents harder to obtain. 
196 Anton et al., supra note 5, at 8 (“Generally, weak property rights reduce the prize 
available to a patent holder.”). 
197 Burk & Lemley, supra note 120, at 8. Even when the scope of protection for issued 
patents is optimally calibrated, U.S. patent law can undermine U.S. competitive advantage 
if the U.S. Patent Office fails to correctly apply the standards for issuing patents, such as 
when trivial advances over existing technology receive patent protection. Patents on such 
min
xt. 
or inventions will undermine competition by and among U.S. firms but will not en-
courage U.S. firms to discover commercially significant technological information. Conse-
quently, patents on trivial technological advancements will undermine competitive advan-
tage in the United States. 
198 See Fritz, supra note 152, at 80 (remarking on the inability to empirically measure 
the costs and benefits of the U.S. patent system); supra notes 147–151 and accompanying 
text (illustrating the importance of striking a proper balance but observing the empirical 
impossibility of doing so). 
199 See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying te
1944 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1909 
crease U.S. competitiveness.200 Thirty-five years ago, genetically modi-
fied organisms, software, and business methods were largely ineligible 
for patent protection, but discoveries in each of these areas are fre-
quently patented today.201 U.S. patent law is also less likely to hold pat-
ents invalid than foreign patent systems. For example, under U.S. pat-
ent law, an inventor can publicly disclose an invention for up to one 
year before submitting a patent application.202 In most other countries, 
public disclosure of an invention at any time before the filing of a pat-
ent application will usually invalidate a patent.203 Building on a “con-
sensus for stronger [U.S.] patent protection,” Congress established the 
                                                                                                                      
200 See Keith Bentele & Alexander Ibs
Multiplying Motives?, 95 J. Pat. & Tradem
en, Exploring the Patent Surge: Increased Incentives or 
ark Off. Soc’y 99, 100 (2013) (stating that U.S. 
patent protection has been strengthened during the past three decades); supra notes 4–7 
and
nomic Report of the President 246 (2012). Nev-
erth
atent strength from the last few decades. See su-
pra 
2010) (holding that some business 
met
ss also expanded the defini-
tion nclude the importation of a product “which 
is m
 accompanying text. This one-sided approach has tempered recently to reflect a great-
er emphasis on optimally calibrating patent strength. For example, in a 2006 report, the 
Council of Economic Advisers to the President asserted that “[w]ell-defined and well-
enforced intellectual property rights are an important component of the U.S. economy 
and an important element in fostering continued economic growth.” Council of Econ. 
Advisers, supra note 4, at 229; see also Council on Competitiveness, supra note 5, at 81 
(stating that the United States “cannot afford to rest on its laurels as the leading innova-
tion economy in the world”). Likewise, in 2012, the Council of Economic Advisers to the 
President noted that “many observers have raised concerns about the U.S. patent system.” 
Council of Econ. Advisers, The Eco
eless, while lawmakers have changed their rhetorical emphasis, they have not advo-
cated for rolling back the expansions in p
notes 4–7 and accompanying text (illustrating U.S. policymakers’ devotion to a strong 
patent system). 
201 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (
hods may be patented); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (conferring 
patent protection on organisms produced by genetic engineering); State St. Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a data 
processing system is a patentable invention). In 1988, Congre
 of infringement under the Patent Act to i
ade from a process patented in the United States.” Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 9005(a), 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. § 295 (2006)). 
202 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). The Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act recently changed some of the details of this one-year grace period. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 
sec. 3(b), § 102(b), 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006 & 
Supp. V 2011)). Before the Act, an inventor’s public use of an invention would only invali-
date a patent if the use took place “more than one year prior to the date of the application 
for patent in the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (amended 2011). Under the 
new law, public use of an invention will invalidate a patent if it took place “before the ef-
fective filing date” of a patent application, but public use by the inventor during the year 
preceding the filing of a patent application does not invalidate the patent. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a)–(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
203 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 Har-
vard J.L. & Tech. 545, 591 n.220 (2012). 
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U  Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 and granted this 
court exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals arising under U.S. patent 
law.
.S.
 and technological progress 
204 In the eyes of many observers, the Federal Circuit has strength-
ened patent law by construing patents broadly, narrowing the grounds 
for invalidating patents, and limiting some defenses to patent in-
fringement.205 As a result, it is more likely that patents will be deemed 
valid today than in the past.206 Because other countries have not fol-
lowed suit, the scope of protection under U.S. patent law now exceeds 
that of many other countries.207 
 In light of these expansions to U.S. patent protection, a growing 
group of scholars and jurists have begun to assert that the costs of patent 
protection in the United States exceed the benefits.208 Some prominent 
scholars have argued that during the late 1990s, patents likely “provided 
a net disincentive to innovation outside the chemical and pharmaceuti-
cal industries.”209 These scholars have concluded that without the U.S. 
patent system, “[t]he rate of innovation
                                                                                                                      
204 Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 119, at 61; see also Burk & Lemley, supra 
note 120, at 3 (describing the “consensus in favor of strong patent protection that has ex-
isted since the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit”). 
roperty protections). Compare, e.g., Opinion of 
the osal for a European Parliament and 
Cou on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions,’ 1996 O.J. (C 
295 g Biotechnological Innovation] (evaluating 
whe
t protection), and Harvard Coll. v. 
Can
hannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 119, at 60 (suggesting that “the U.S. pat-
ent been subjected to withering attacks by 
criti
205 See Merges et al., supra note 137, at 128 n.17 (collecting citations regarding em-
pirical studies showing the strengthening of patent rights); see also, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. 
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288–90 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (restricting 
the availability of equitable defenses to patent infringement). 
206 Merges et al., supra note 137, at 128. 
207 See supra notes 188–191 and accompanying text (illustrating resistance by foreign 
corporations to increases in intellectual p
Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Prop
ncil Directive 
) 11 [hereinafter EU Opinion Regardin
ther the availability of patent rights for biotechnology inventions helped U.S. interests 
excel in biotechnology research), and Boldrin & Levine, supra note 1, at 46 (observing 
that business practices and financial securities are patentable in the United States), with 
European Patent Convention art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255 (stating that “meth-
ods for . . . doing business” are not eligible for paten
ada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (Can.) (“Patenting higher life forms would involve a radical 
departure from the traditional patent regime.”). Concededly, some expansions of the 
scope of U.S. patent law may increase U.S. competitive advantage by improving incentives 
to invent. See, e.g., EU Opinion Regarding Biotechnology Innovation supra, at 11 (consider-
ing whether patents on biotechnological inventions bolstered biotechnology research). 
208 See Bo
system is in crisis” and observing that “[i]t has 
cs of every political stripe”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 120, at 21 (“Public policy cir-
cles are replete with arguments that the patent system is broken, perhaps irretrievably.”); 
Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 21 (noting that “the high social costs of intellectual 
property rights create uncertainty as to whether on balance such rights are, from an over-
all social standpoint, cost-justified at all”). 
209 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 128, at 142. 
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might have been even greater, perhaps much greater.”210 Other promi-
nent scholars have conducted similar analyses of the costs and benefits 
of the patent system and concluded that U.S. patent law is “in crisis”211 
and “broke.”212 These scholars have argued that patent law is “an un-
necessary evil,”213 and that “abolishing intellectual property protection 
is the only socially responsible thing to do.”214 Jurists have also begun to 
express their concern regarding the tradeoff struck by U.S. patent law. 
Judge and scholar Richard Posner recently stated, “It’s not clear that we 
really need patents in most industries.”215 
 Significantly, these critiques of U.S. patent law have not considered 
the harmful ss. If the as-
ssm
impact of U.S. patents on U.S. competitivene
se ents of these commentators are correct and U.S. patent law needs 
reform without considering the impact of U.S. patents on U.S. competi-
tive advantage, then change is certainly warranted under a more com-
prehensive analysis. Competitiveness analysis thus both corroborates 
and provides additional evidence for these analyses.216 When all of 
these critiques are considered alongside lawmakers’ incomplete under-
standing of the impact of U.S. patent law on U.S. competitiveness, it 
appears likely that U.S. patent protection should be weakened in order 
to maximize U.S. competitive advantage. 
                                                                                                                      
210 Id. at 146. 
211 Burk & Lemley, supra note 120, at 3. 
212 See Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 142, at 1; see also Carrier, supra note 116, at 1 (“In-
novation . . . has been threatened in recent years. Part of the blame, surprisingly enough, 
lies with the U.S. legal system.”); Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1263 (“On the whole, 
technology entrepreneurs tell us that the patent system is neither working particularly 
poorly nor well for their companies and industries.”). 
213 Boldrin & Levine, supra note 1, at 3; see also Don Tiller, Devaluing Invention: The 
Push for Patent Reform, 14 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 119, 121 (2007) (“Recently, it has been 
argued that the U.S. patent system is broken and has become a social burden, merely serv-
ing to grant unnecessary economic monopolies at the expense of consumers without creat-
ing 
 & Levine, supra note 1, at 243–44. 
/. Judge Posner made these 
com
an extra incentive to invent; or worse, that the patent system actually reduces incentive 
to invent.”). 
214 Boldrin
215 John Brodkin, Judge Who Threw Out Apple/Moto Case Calls Patent Litigants “Animals,” 
Ars Technica (July 5, 2012, 11:35 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/ 
judge-who-threw-out-applemoto-case-calls-patent-litigants-animals
ments shortly after he dismissed patent claims and counterclaims in a suit between 
technological powerhouses Apple, Inc. and Motorola, Inc. See generally Apple, Inc. v. Mo-
torola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (dismissing patent lawsuit in its entirety). 
216 Cf. Burk & Lemley, supra note 120, at 21 (“[W]hen that many people with that 
many different perspectives have decided that something is wrong, it is time to sit up and 
take notice.”). 
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B. Cost/Benefit Recalibrations to U.S. Patent Law 
 Although the impact of U.S. patent law on domestic rivalry has 
been largely overlooked, commentators have long recognized that pat-
ents generally promote innovation but undermine competition and 
that many patent law doctrines affect this tradeoff.217 Despite agree-
enm t on the existence of this tradeoff, scholars disagree about whether 
reforms to U.S. patent law will improve or worsen it. By identifying ad-
ditional costs inherent in current U.S. patent law—including the harms 
to U.S. competitiveness stemming from reduced domestic rivalry—the 
analysis of competitive advantage provides additional support for some 
of these reforms. 
  For example, some scholars argue that inventors should be re-
quired to provide more information regarding their inventions in their 
patent applications.218 This additional information could provide bet-
ter notice regarding the scope of patent rights and thus help competi-
tors develop non-infringing alternatives to patented technologies. On 
the other hand, requiring patent applicants to provide additional in-
formation would raise costs for inventors, thereby reducing incentives 
 into vent. As a result, other scholars have argued that the costs to inven-
tors due to additional disclosure requirements may outweigh resulting 
benefits to competitors.219 An analysis of competitive advantage may 
help to resolve this dispute. To the extent that expanding the disclosure 
requirements for U.S. patents fosters competition, such a change would 
incr y among U.S. firms more than rivalry within 
 
     
ease domestic rivalr
foreign countries. In contrast, the additional costs of increased disclo-
sure would be borne by both U.S. and foreign inventors.220 
Similarly, considerations of competitive advantage suggest that 
greater resources should be spent reducing the number of invalid pat-
                                                                                                                 
217 See supra notes 170–187 and accompanying text (explaining that U.S. policymakers 
have
9–17 
(201
0 
(200
 strengthened U.S. patent protection to incentivize innovation and have attempted to 
strengthen foreign patent law to limit competitive disparities). 
218 See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 128, at 239; Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Herme-
neutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 333, 371–80 (2007); Harry 
Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1737, 180
1); see also John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-
Markman Era, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 153, 164 (2005) (noting that “many commentators 
believe that it is only fair that inventors should claim their inventions precisely”). 
219 William Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: The Impor-
tance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 327, 359–6
9) (discussing tradeoffs inherent in communicating the scope of patent rights). 
220 See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 889–90 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (indicating that for-
eign investors must abide by U.S. patent law requirements because foreign patents are not 
assertable in the United States). 
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ents issued by the U.S. Patent Office. U.S. patents may be invalid for 
many reasons. For example, a valid patent must describe an invention 
that is useful and substantially different from existing technology, and it 
also must provide sufficient information for a person of ordinary skill 
in the relevant technological field to utilize the patented invention.221 
Though the U.S. Patent Office strives to issue only valid patents, mis-
takes are common, in part because budgetary constraints force patent 
examiners to spend very little time reviewing each patent applica-
tion.222 Moreover, proving that patents are valid after they issue can be 
iffid cult because challengers must prove that patents are invalid by 
clear and convincing evidence.223 
 Like all patents, invalid patents can reduce competition in the 
United States. But unlike the harm to competition caused by valid pat-
ents, the harm to competition caused by the possibility of patent inva-
lidity is not commensurately justified by inventive benefits.224 One way 
to reduce the number of invalid patents issued by the U.S. Patent Of-
fice is to increase the resources that the U.S. Patent Office can devote 
to patent examination, for example by raising the filing fees for patent 
applicants.225 Although raising patenting costs for inventors would re-
duce the net value of patents and thus, to some degree, reduce incen-
tives to invent, an analysis of competitive advantage suggests that, to 
some extent, reduced incentives to invent may be justified because re-
                                                                                                                      
221 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp.
(non-obviousness); id. § 112 (sufficiency 
 V 2011) (usefulness); id. § 102 (novelty); id. § 103 
of information). 
222 Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 
Sta
artz 
& C Patent 
Law
reponderance of the evidence standard). 
e-patent-
syst
 
n. L. Rev. 45, 61 (2007); Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 675, 679 (2009). By one estimate, patent examiners spend on average only 
eighteen hours reviewing a typical patent application. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, 
The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 77, 135 (2002). 
223 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2251 (2011). But see David. L. Schw
hristopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Experiment from 
, 26 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 429, 432 (2013) (finding in an empirical study that mock ju-
rors found a patent invalid under a clear and convincing standard at rates statistically in-
distinguishable from invalidation under a p
224 See Katherine E. White, Preserving the Patent Process to Incentivize Innovation in Global 
Economy, 13 Syracuse Sci. & Tech. L. Rep. 27, 30–33 (2006) (“Making it easier to invali-
date patents will lessen their economic value. It is likely that such a change will have a neg-
ative affect [sic] on the incentive to innovate.”). 
225 James Bessen et al., Can New Fees Fix the Patent System? Experts Weigh In, Wired (Sept. 
6, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/09/can-new-fees-fix-th
em/ (suggesting that “[m]ore patent applications mean more low-quality patents” and 
observing that “[t]he [U.S. Patent Office] is well-known for its tendency to grant patent 
applications rather than go through the cost and hassle of denials and referrals”).
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d ng the number of invalid U.S. patents would increase U.S. com-
petitiveness in global markets. 
 Competitive advantage analysis indicates that if patenting fees in-
crease, those costs perhaps should not rise for all types of inventors. As 
described above, U.S. patents do not provide equal incentives to invent 
for foreign and U.S. inventors when language barriers, cultural differ-
ences, and other transaction costs significantly raise the costs of foreign 
inventors obtaining U.S. patents.
uci
e United States than 
 fo
 obligations for patent applicants in the U.S. Pat-
t O
226 Such costs are likely greater for 
small businesses in foreign countries than for sophisticated foreign 
corporations.227 Consequently, U.S. patents may provide more signifi-
cant incentives to invent for small businesses in th
in reign countries. Raising patenting costs among small businesses 
would reduce this advantage because U.S. businesses would shoulder 
the bulk of the increased financial burden—and thus invent less. In 
contrast, raising fees among large corporations would more equiva-
lently reduce incentives to invent for both foreign and U.S. firms. In 
fact, U.S. patent law already requires larger companies to pay higher 
fees to obtain U.S. patents,228 a feature that may contribute to U.S. 
competitive advantage.229 
 Although weakening U.S. patent law by adjusting patent law doc-
trines related to patent scope and validity may increase U.S. competitive 
advantage, implementing such reforms is difficult because empirical 
challenges hinder the effective recalibration of U.S. patent law.230 For 
example, if disclosure
en ffice should increase, empirical challenges make it difficult to de-
termine how much those obligations should increase. Likewise, even if 
sophisticated inventors should pay larger fees when applying for pat-
ents, it is not clear how much larger those fees should be. Because of 
                                                                                                                      
226 See Hubbard, supra note 8, at 364–65; supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
227 Cf. Patenting by Organizations 2011, supra note 113, at A1-1 (reporting that in 2011, 
28% of corpora-
tion
. V 2011) (stating that small businesses, inde-
pen
The overall innovative contribution of unsophisticated inventors, however, is un-
clea
 of individual inventors receiving U.S. patents were foreign, whereas 52% 
s receiving U.S. patents were foreign). 
228 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2006 & Supp
dent inventors, and nonprofit organizations shall have fees “reduced by 50 percent”). 
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act established even lower fees for particularly small 
and unsophisticated patent applicants. Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 10(b), 125 Stat. 284, 316–
17 (2011); see Tony Dutra, Bloomberg Law, PTO Publishes Final Rule on Micro Entity Status 
for Reduced Patent Application Fees, Daily Rep. for Execs., Dec. 21, 2012, at 1, 1–2. 
229 
r. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 128, at 166 (contending that “the role of the small 
inventor is frequently hyped and distorted”); Hubbard, supra note 98, at 410–11. 
230 See Fritz, supra note 152, at 80; supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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these empirical obstacles, lawmakers should be careful when adjusting 
U.S. patent law to increase U.S. competitiveness. 
 One way to address these empirical challenges is to focus on re-
forms that do not significantly reduce incentives to invent. Although 
patents are designed to create meaningful incentives to invent, empiri-
cal studies have found that, in some industries, patents are less impor-
tant for encouraging invention.231 For example, one recent study found 
that software entrepreneurs consider patents to be only “[s]lightly im-
portant” to protecting new discoveries.232 Despite industry differences, 
the scope o r all types 
f te
                                                                                                                     
f patent protection is in many respects identical fo
o chnology.233 In industries where patents provide weaker incentives 
to innovate, the competitive cost of U.S. patent law is more likely to ex-
ceed the factor-creation benefits. As a result, modestly weakening pat-
ent protection in such industries may allow rivalry to flourish without 
reducing innovation. 
 Industry-specific patent reform, however, may not increase U.S. 
competitive advantage for several reasons. First, accurately identifying 
technologies for which patents provide less incentive to invent is diffi-
cult. Empirical studies that evaluate the incentive effect of patents use 
broad industry categorizations that include many different types of 
technologies within them.234 Second, it would be difficult to draft legis-
lation that appropriately defined the relevant industries, as industry 
boundaries are “ vague and notoriously mutable.”235 Statutory categori-
zation likely would be imprecise too, particularly as technology changes 
over time.236 Third, even if lawmakers could accurately identify tech-
nologies where patents provide less incentive to invent, patents may still 
be a significant factor. For example, the study that found that patents 
 
231 Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1283; Levin et al., supra note 123, at 796–97, 818. 
eat differ-
ent diciary is better suited to this task than Con-
gres
te 1, at 1290 (describing the incentive effect of pat-
ents
icles). 
8 (describing some pitfalls of employing industry-specific measures). 
232 Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1290. 
233 The U.S. Patent Act contains few technology-specific provisions. See generally 35 U.S. 
§§ 101–103, 112 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (establishing basic patent law parameters). Courts 
may, however, apply these technology-neutral laws differently to different technologies. See 
generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 120 (arguing that U.S. patent law should tr
technologies differently and that the ju
s). 
234 See, e.g., Graham et al., supra no
 for “[b]iotechnology”); Levin et al., supra note 123, at 797 (describing the incentive 
effect of patents for computers, communications equipment, and motor veh
235 Burk & Lemley, supra note 120, at 98. 
236 Id. at 98–99 (“The history of industry-specific statutes suggests that many fail be-
cause they are drafted with then-current technology in mind and are not sufficiently gen-
eral to accommodate the inevitable changes in technology.”); see also Hubbard, supra note 
8, at 377–7
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were “[s]lightly important” to protecting software did not find that pat-
ents were “[n]ot important at all.”237 
C. Patent Harmonization and Competitive Advantage 
 Patent harmonization provides another potential avenue for weak-
ening U.S. patent law to increase the competitive advantage of U.S. 
firms. As noted earlier, when U.S. patent law provides stronger rights 
than foreign patent law, U.S. patents harm domestic rivalry in the 
United States more than foreign patents harm rivalry in their home 
countries.238 Consequently, harmonizing U.S. patent law with foreign 
patent laws could eliminate some of the asymmetries currently under-
mining U.S. competitiveness. For instance, the United States recently 
changed from a “first-to-invent” patent system, which used invention 
dates to determine certain issues of validity and patent ownership, to a 
first“ -to-file” system, which relies instead on patent application filing 
dates.239 At the time the United States made this change, every other 
patent system in the world was a first-to-file system.240 Some lawmakers 
opposed the change, arguing that it would “weaken our unique U.S. 
system by forcing our country to ‘harmonize’ U.S. patent standards 
downward to the level of the weaker systems in Europe and Asia.”241 
Even if concerns regarding the weakening effect of this harmonization 
were correct, these opponents may have supported the change if they 
were aware that it might promote U.S. economic prosperity. 
 Despite its potential advantages, harmonization can reduce U.S. 
competitiveness when the optimal balance between incentives to invent 
and domestic rivalry is different for the United States than for other 
countries.242 As described above, stronger patent laws are more likely to 
inc
of a
                                                                                                       
rease the competitive advantage of countries in which factor condi-
tions, like the availability of highly educated workers and the presence 
dvanced research universities, lower the cost of discovering new in-
               
638, Patent 
Ref
cher, Toward Better Patent Reform, Politico ( June 20, 2011), http:// 
www stein Opposes 
First
at 1116–17 (arguing that intellectual property law 
disp r conditions). 
237 Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1290. 
238 See supra notes 159–169 and accompanying text (illustrating this point). 
239 Hubbard, supra note 8, at 367. 
240 Wendy H. Schacht & John R. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv., R41
orm in the 112th Congress: Innovation Issues 7 (2011). 
241 Dana Rohraba
.politico.com/news/stories/0611/57394.html; see Kevin Noonan, Senator Fein
-to-File Provisions of Patent Reform Bill (S. 23), Pat. Docs (Mar. 3, 2011, 11:59 PM), 
http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/03/senator-feinstein-opposes-the-first-to-file-provisions- of- 
s-23.html. 
242 See Reichman, supra note 103, 
arately affects countries with divergent facto
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ventions.243 Countries where firms rarely discover new inventions, like 
developing countries, have consequently been reluctant to enact robust 
intellectual property laws.244 Thus, particularly for aspects of patent law 
for which there is not global uniformity, the United States should exer-
cise caution when weakening patent protection through harmoniza-
on
s and also increases incentives to invent by strengthening the 
validity of U.S. patents.248 On the other hand, by limiting the circum-
U.S. patent law provides stronger 
ate
                                                                                                                     
ti .245 
 As with other possible changes, empirical challenges make it diffi-
cult to determine whether adopting the patent laws from another legal 
system would increase U.S. competitiveness.246 For instance, as noted 
earlier, public disclosure of an invention before an inventor files a pat-
ent application will invalidate a patent on that invention in many coun-
tries, but U.S. patent law provides a one-year grace period.247 In some 
respects, the one-year grace period may bolster U.S. competitiveness. 
The grace period potentially accelerates the public disclosure of new 
invention
stances in which patents are invalid, 
p nt rights than those available in most other countries, and stronger 
U.S. patents inhibit competition by and among U.S. firms.249 Moreover, 
the grace period’s benefits are available to foreign inventors who apply 
for U.S. patents.250 Ultimately, it may be difficult (if not impossible) to 
measure accurately whether eliminating the one-year grace period 
would increase U.S. competitiveness. 
 
ompetitive ad-
vant
t 
988.
ficient incentives to innovate. 
 
other countries do not have a 
grac atent disclosures). 
so indicating that more foreign inventors obtain U.S. patents than U.S. inventors). 
243 See supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text; see also Porter, supra note 3, at 80 
(discussing the impact of “public and private educational institutions” on c
age). 
244 See Reichman, supra note 103, at 1116–17 (observing that developing countries may 
not benefit significantly from strong intellectual property regimes); Yu, supra note 13, a
 Indeed, firms in such countries may rely on the availability of patents in other coun-
tries, including the United States, to provide suf
245 Cf. Gerla, supra note 15, at 249 (warning against the dangers of a “monomaniacal 
devotion to rivalry”).
246 See Fritz, supra note 151, at 80; supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) 
(2006 & Supp. V 2011) (creating a one-year grace period for patent disclosures), with 
Ouellette, supra note 203, at 591 n.220 (indicating that most 
e period for p
248 H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 38, 41 (2011). 
249 See supra notes 159–169 and accompanying text (illustrating how strong U.S. patent 
rights inhibit domestic competition and consequently global competition). 
250 See supra notes 159–169 and accompanying text (explaining that foreign holders of 
U.S. patents receive the same patent protections that U.S. holders of U.S. patents receive 
and al
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 Because of these empirical challenges, narrow reforms may be bet-
ter suited to boosting U.S. competitive advantage than broad ones. 
Changes could be focused on situations where there is strong evidence 
that changes will drastically increase domestic rivalry while only mar-
ginally reducing incentives to innovate.251 Because domestic rivalry is 
often the most important determinant of competitive advantage, such 
changes are more likely to increase competitive advantage.252 The fol-
lowing Subsections analyze reforms to two defenses to patent infringe-
ment for which harmonization is likely to increase U.S. competitive ad-
vantage. 
1. The Experimental Use Defense 
 Experimentation on patented inventions is vital to competition.253 
Through experimentation, competitors can “invent around” a patent; 
that is, they can develop competing technology that avoids infringing a 
patent.254 Without efforts to invent around a patent, the patent owner 
may be able to obtain supracompetitive returns to the detriment of so-
ciety even though alternative technologies otherwise could be found.255 
Experimentation also enables competitors to improve upon a patented 
invention.256 Indeed, a successful follow-on innovator may be able to 
exp
                                                                                              
obtain a patent on an improvement to a patented invention.257 In addi-
tion, experimentation may be required to ensure that, when a patent 
ires, a firm is ready to begin competing with the former patent 
                        
–90 and accompanying text (discussing the determinants of com-
peti
251 Cf. Baker, supra note 57, at 589 (advocating for targeted rules and enforcement pri-
orities in antitrust law to promote innovation). 
252 See supra notes 43
tive advantage). 
253 Ted Hagelin, The Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement: Information on Ice, 
Competition on Hold, 58 Fla. L. Rev. 483, 499 (2006) (“[I]f the public and competitors are 
unable to use patented inventions for genuine experimentation, then scientific knowledge 
is retarded and market competition is limited.”). 
254 Id. at 533. 
255 Cf. Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1311 (reporting that a significant reason compa-
nies do not patent inventions is because other inventors may invent around those inven-
tions); Levin et al., supra note 123, at 802–03 (indicating that a major weakness in patent 
protection is the capacity of competitors to invent around patents). Competitors, however, 
may also be able to invent around a patent without experimenting on the patented inven-
tion. 
256 Hagelin, supra note 253, at 533; see also Alan L. Durham, The Factral Geometry of In-
vention, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 489, 490 (2012) (“Most inventions are variations on what has come 
before and have the potential to generate further variations or refinements.”). 
257 See generally Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 127, at  1235 (defining an im-
provement patent as “[a] patent having claims directed to an improvement on a preexist-
ing invention”). 
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owner.258 Although patents must provide significant information re-
garding an invention, these disclosure requirements do “not require an 
inventor to meet lofty standards for success in the commercial market-
place.”259 Given this dearth of information, considerable experimenta-
on
h a
ti   may be required to commercialize a patented invention.260 For all 
these reasons, unless competitors can perform such experimentation 
during the term of a patent, meaningful competition regarding the 
invention may not commence until well after the patent expires. 
 Current U.S. patent law does not explicitly allow competitors to 
experiment on patented technology. Instead, a U.S. patent simply 
grants its owner the exclusive right to “use” an invention, and the basic 
provisions of the Patent Act do not provide any significant limits on the 
uses covered by that right.261 Courts initially interpreted “use” narrowly, 
holding that experimentation is not a “use” of technology subject to 
patent infringement liability.262 As Justice Joseph Story explained in 
1813, “it could never have been the intention of the legislature to pun-
is  man, who constructed . . . a machine merely for philosophical ex-
periments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the ma-
chine to produce its described effects.”263 
 More recently, however, the Federal Circuit has all but eliminated 
the defense.264 For example, the Federal Circuit has held that the ex-
                                                                                                                      
258 Under current law, patents generally expire twenty years from the date the patent 
application was filed with the U.S. Patent Office. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 
2011 & Supp. VI 2012). 
259 CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
260 See Karl F. Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret Complementariness: An Unsuspected Synergy, 48 
Washburn L.J. 1, 23 (2008); see also Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1290 (observing that 
entrepreneurs tend to find “first-mover advantage” more important than patents in gain-
ing competitive advantage); Levin et al., supra note 123, at 794–95 (noting that in many 
industries “learning curve advantages” are more important that patent protection). 
261 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). Other provisions of U.S. patent law ap-
pea tation but do not explicitly sanction it. For example, U.S. 
pate
(No. 2262) (“It 
has eld, and is no doubt now well settled, that an experiment with a patented article 
for 
hittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. 
Mas
che Prods., Inc. v. Bolar 
 
r to encourage experimen
nt law requires that a patent applicant disclose sufficient information about an inven-
tion to enable a person of ordinary skill to practice the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006 & 
Supp. V 2011); see also Hagelin, supra note 253, at 513–15 (arguing that the enablement 
requirement of section 112 demonstrates the need for an experimental use defense). 
262 See Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) 
 been h
the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amuse-
ment, is not an infringement of the rights of the patentee.”); Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 
555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391); W
s. 1813) (No. 17,600). 
263 Cutter, F. Cas. at 1121. 
264 See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Embrex, Inc. 
v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ro
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perimental use defense applies only to experiments “for amusement, to 
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”265 Any ex-
periment “in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business” 
does not qualify for the defense.266 In fact, the Federal Circuit has even 
fu
experimentation even in early stages in the development of a com-
pound that might one day be submitted for FDA approval.271 Thus, for 
biomedical research, the experimental use defense provides robust 
protection. But outside of this technological arena, the defense is all 
but
re sed to apply the defense to experiments designed to identify non-
infringing alternatives to a patented invention.267 For instance, the court 
refused to apply the defense to efforts by a pharmaceutical company to 
obtain Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for a generic 
version of a patented drug even though the company did not intend to 
produce the generic drug until after the patent on the drug expired.268 
 On the other hand, one aspect of the experimental use defense 
has broadened in recent years. In response to the Federal Circuit’s rul-
ings that the experimental use defense does not protect efforts to de-
velop generic drugs, Congress added a new provision to the Patent Act 
that extends the experimental use defense to “uses reasonably related 
to the development and submission of information under a Federal law 
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”269 The Federal 
Circuit initially interpreted this provision narrowly, holding that it ap-
plied only to “clinical testing to supply information to the FDA” and did 
not apply to general biomedical research.270 Ultimately, though, the 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the provision permits reasonable 
 meaningless.272 
                                                                                                                      
Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 1860–61 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006 & 
Supp. V 2011) (establishing the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction). 
265 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362–63 (quoting Embrex, Inc., 216 F.3d at 1349). 
266 Id. 
267 See Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1346, 1349 (holding that an inventor infringed a patent by 
experimenting with a patented method of inoculating birds even though the inventor 
inte
t of the protection provided 
 
nded to design around the patent). 
268 Roche Prods., Inc., 733 F.2d at 1860–61. 
269 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
270 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rev’d 
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2003). 
271 Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 207. 
272 Beyond the realm of utility patents (patents granted for a process, a machine, a 
manufacture, or a composition of matter), the Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 2321–2382 (2012), which protects novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants, explic-
itly contains a broad experimental use defense to claims asserted under its provisions. 7 
U.S.C. § 2544 (“The use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or 
other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringemen
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 Importantly, expanding the experimental use defense in the Unit-
ed States would not significantly undermine incentives to invent. In-
hening the 
pe
example, Japanese patent law states that “[a] patent right shall not be 
                                                                                                                     
stead, a broader experimental use defense would merely ensure that 
inventors receive rights no broader than those explicitly established by 
law. For example, experimentation that prepares a competitor to use 
patented technology after the patent expires does not limit the scope of 
exclusive patent rights during the statutory term of the patent. Similarly, 
exempting from patent liability experimentation that allows competi-
tors to develop non-infringing alternatives to a patented technology 
simply limits patent protection to the invention described in the patent. 
So long as Congress, the courts, and the U.S. Patent Office have estab-
lished adequate incentives to invent through aspects of patent law only 
tangentially related to the experimental use defense, strengt
ex rimental use defense will not reduce those incentives.273 Indeed, 
without a meaningful experimental use defense, patent owners may 
receive excessively broad patent rights that actually impede future ef-
forts to invent by preventing researchers from building on patented 
discoveries.274 Thus, rather than reducing incentives to invent, a broad-
er experimental use defense can actually encourage invention. 
 Moreover, unlike U.S. patent law, the patent laws of many foreign 
jurisdictions provide broader protection for experimentation.275 For 
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s contribution to the field of art as described in 
the 
tent 
righ
the scope of this de-
fens
er this chapter.”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 127, at 1236 (defining 
utility patent). 
273 It is unlikely that, in determining the appropriate scope of patent protection in the 
United States, Congress, courts, and the U.S. Patent Office relied on the absence of a 
meaningful experimental use defense. For example, as noted above, a robust experimental 
use defense will sometimes be necessary to ensure that a patent does not prevent competi-
tors from developing non-infringing alternatives to the patented technology. The Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals has recently expressed its belief that patent rights should be lim-
ited to the scope of the patented invention, and thus should not restrict the d
on-infringing technologies. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that “the scope of the right to exclude . . . [should] 
not overreach the scope of the inventor’
patent specification” (internal quote marks omitted) (quoting Univ. of Rochester v. 
G.D. Searle & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2010))). 
274 See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text (explaining that broad pa
ts can inhibit follow-on invention). 
275 Carrier, supra note 116, at 270; see Hagelin, supra note 253 at 520–22. Notably, Chi-
nese patent law contains an explicit experimental use exception, but 
e is unclear as it applies to use of patented technology “specially for the purposes of sci-
entific research and experimentation.” Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Mar. 12, 
1984), art. 69, State Intell. Prop. Off. of the P.R.C. ( Jan. 19, 2011), http://english. 
sipo.gov.cn/laws/lawsregulations/201101/t20110119_566244.html. 
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effective against the working of the patented invention for experimen-
tal or research purposes.”276 Similarly, Korean patent law explicitly al-
lows for use of a “patented invention for the purpose of research or ex-
periments.”277 The patent laws of all but one of the countries in the 
y contain experimental use defenses.278 In 
forced to locate research facilities outside of the United States.281 
     
European Union expressl
fact, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, Spain, Sweden, and the UK all have nearly identical provisions 
that create an experimental use defense in each country.279 
 Because the experimental use defense is weaker in the United 
States than in other jurisdictions, U.S. patent law limits domestic com-
petition more than foreign patent law restricts foreign competition, 
thereby reducing the competitive advantage of U.S. firms. Moreover, 
allowing experimental uses would not significantly undermine incen-
ives t to innovate in the United States. Expanding the experimental use 
defense thus is an example of a situation in which harmonization with 
other patent systems is likely to increase the competitiveness of U.S. 
firms in global markets.280 Indeed, in the absence of a robust experi-
mental use defense in U.S. patent law, some U.S. companies may be 
2. The Prior Use Defense 
 Broadening the prior use defense is another change to U.S. patent 
law that would likely increase the competitive advantage of U.S. firms. 
                                                                                                                 
276 TokkyohŌ [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959, art. 69-1 ( Japan), translated in Patent 
Act (Act No. 121 of 1959), Cabinet Secretariat, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/ 
data/PA.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
277 t No. 
9985, rg., 
http:/  
278  and 
Intel t on 
Behal esearch) 149 (2009). 
 art. 10, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 39 of the 
Eur
 T’ukhopop [Patent Law], Act No. 950, Nov. 28, 1949, art. 96, amended by Ac
Jan. 27, 2010 (S. Kor.), translated in Republic of Korea, World Intell. Prop. O
/www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=214463 (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
 P. Van Eecke et al., Monitoring and Analysis of Technology Transfer
lectual Property Regimes and Their Use: Results of a Study Carried Ou
f of the European Commission (DG R
279 Id. The experimental use defense in many European countries also explicitly ap-
plies to “studies and trials” undertaken to develop generic versions of patented medicines. 
Id. at 144 (quoting Council Directive 2004/27/EC,
opean Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the Community Code Relat-
ing to Medicinal Products for Human Use, art. 10, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 39). 
280 Establishing the appropriate scope of an experimental use defense involves addi-
tional challenges, including, as usual, empirical difficulties. See Hagelin, supra note 253, at 
541–47 (proposing a broader experimental use defense after evaluating a variety of ap-
proaches). 
281 Cf. Moris & Kannankutty, supra note 41, at 1 (reporting that according to the Na-
tional Science Foundation, almost a quarter of all research and development workers em-
ployed by U.S. companies work outside of the United States). 
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Sometimes, the first inventor to seek patent protection is actually the 
second person to discover an invention. As a result, issuing a patent to 
the second person would enable that inventor to prevent the first-in-
time inventor from utilizing the invention. A prior use defense ad-
dresses this situation by allowing an earlier inventor to continue to use 
a discovery, despite the issuance of a patent to a later inventor.282 
 Protecting prior uses from patent infringement generally increases 
omd estic rivalry by exempting from patent liability any competitors 
who began to use a technology before the patentee filed a patent appli-
cation.283 Prior uses are often particularly important to competition 
because the prior user has no opportunity to avoid investing in infring-
ing technology. By definition, the prior user begins to use technology 
before a second inventor obtains a patent on it.284 Consequently, with-
out this defense the prior user often must choose between licensing or 
                                                                                                                      
282 See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (codifying the prior use defense). 
Prior public uses sometimes will invalidate a patent altogether. Secret prior uses, though, 
often do not invalidate patents. For instance, in 1998 in Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, 
Inc., the Federal Circuit stated: 
If the invention was known to or used by others in this country before the 
002 U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
case
gued that it should not be liable for infringement because it had been com-
mer
t, however, found 
that
Flex
nvalid, but the court of appeals vacated 
that
lack’s Law Dictionary, supra note 127, at 1314 (defining prior user right as 
“[t]
date of the patentee’s invention, the later inventor has not contributed to the 
store of knowledge, and has no entitlement to a patent. Accordingly, in order 
to invalidate a patent based on prior knowledge or use, that knowledge or use 
must have been available to the public. 
148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Report 
on the Prior User Rights Defense 29 (2012) (stating that “[p]rior user rights tend to 
work against the excludability function of patents”). 
283 For example, in the 2
 Seal-Flex, Inc. v. W.R. Dougherty & Associates, a patent owner (Seal-Flex) accused a com-
petitor (Dougherty) of infringing a patented method for constructing athletic surfaces. 
Dougherty ar
cially using the patented method more than a year before Seal-Flex submitted its pat-
ent application. 179 F. Supp. 2d 735, 736–37 (E.D. Mich. 2002). The cour
 Dougherty had waived any claim to prior use., id. at 741–42, and later awarded Seal-
Flex substantial damages. See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. W.R. Dougherty & Assos., 254 F. Supp. 2d 
647, 660 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (determining remedies for plaintiff). Had the court applied 
the prior use defense, Seal-Flex might have faced more intense rivalry. Indeed, Seal-Flex 
had already asserted the patent against other competitors in two separate lawsuits. See Seal-
, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 870 F. Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Seal-
Flex, Inc. v. Atlas Tracks, Inc., No. 1:92-CV-194, 1993 WL 763152, at *1–2 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 
12, 1993), vacated, No. 93-1432, 1994 WL 745348 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 1994). In one of these 
cases, the district court held that the patent was i
 ruling pursuant to settlement agreements and a joint motion to vacate. Atlas Tracks, 
Inc., 1994 WL 745348, at *1. 
284 B
he right of a first inventor to continue using an invention after someone else has pat-
ented it”). 
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in rring significant costs to switch to a non-infringing alternative. In 
either case, the prior use defense protects competitors from costs that 
reduce rivalry.
cu
s through patents and opt instead for trade secret 
rot
cret has no claim against a competitor that independently invents or 
291
                                     
285 
 Despite the competitive benefits of the prior use defense, the de-
fense may reduce rivalry in one narrow sense: it can encourage some 
firms to protect their discoveries with trade secrets rather than pat-
ents.286 To obtain a patent, an inventor must disclose substantial infor-
mation about an invention, including sufficient information to enable 
a person of ordinary skill to practice the invention without undue ex-
perimentation.287 Competitors may use this information to compete 
with a patent owner, particularly once a patent expires.288 The prior use 
defense shelters from liability firms that avoid disclosing their inven-
tions to competitor
p ection. As a result, a prior use defense may undermine incentives 
to disclose information that promotes competition.289 
 Nevertheless, even if prior use rights undermine disclosure, any 
resultant reduction in competition is more than offset by an increase in 
competition arising from independent innovation. This is because the 
protection afforded by trade secrets is comparatively fleeting. Patents 
provide broad rights to exclude; even independent invention is not a 
defense to patent infringement.290 In contrast, the owner of a trade se-
reverse engineers the secret.  Indeed, some courts and commentators 
                                                                                 
 accompanying text (discussing switching costs). 
 to, and 
not 
 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 282, at 31; see Anton et al., supra 
note
ary to successfully commercialize the invention may be 
pro
mley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 
1421
iation of confidential information. See id. § 1(2). 
285 See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of licensing); 
supra notes 133–134 and
286 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 282, at 34. A trade secret is informa-
tion that “derives independent economic value . . . from not being generally known
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain eco-
nomic value from its disclosure or use, and . . . is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985). 
287 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see Brian J. Love & Christopher P. Sea-
man, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 Yale J.L. & Tech. 1, 3 (2012). Indeed, some firms choose 
to forgo patent protection in order to avoid disclosing information that may be helpful to 
competitors. Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1313. 
288 Jorda, supra note 260, at 26; see supra notes 264–268 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing legal obstacles to experimenting on a patented technology during the term of the 
patent). 
289
 5, at 5. Even when an invention is disclosed through a patent, however, significant 
amounts of information necess
tected with trade secrecy. Jorda, supra note 260, at 28–31. 
290 Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Le
, 1460–61 (2009). 
291 See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt. Trade secret law protects the owner of a 
trade secret from the misappropr
1960 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1909 
assert that competitors frequently discover inventions protected by 
trade secrets “long before the time when a patent would have expired,” 
ven
oting innovation than patents.298 For example, 
                                                                                                                     
e  when trade secrets are not misappropriated.292 In other words, 
“[w]here patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law functions rela-
tively as a sieve.”293 
 A strong prior use defense will not significantly reduce incentives 
to innovate for two reasons. First, a prior use defense does not impact 
the patent owner’s ability to hold liable an infringer that begins to use 
the patented invention after the inventor submits a patent application. 
In such a situation, the defense does not apply.294 Moreover, because 
the transferability of the prior use defense is severely limited, later in-
fringers cannot avoid liability by purchasing the defense from a prior 
user.295 Accordingly, even with a strong prior use defense, patents will 
provide substantial incentives for inventors to discover and disclose in-
ventions. 
 Second, to the extent that a prior use defense reduces the incen-
tive to innovate derived from patent protection, the defense simultane-
ously increases the incentives to innovate secured by trade secret law. 
Like patents, trade secrets provide important incentives to innovate.296 
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[c]ertainly the patent policy of en-
couraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of another form 
of incentive to invention.”297 Indeed, trade secrets often are more effec-
tive incentives for prom
 
292 Jorda, supra note 260, at 6–8 (quoting Dunlop Holdings Ltd. v. Ram Golf Corp., 524 
F.2d orp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 
(19 ts have an average life of less than five years. Jorda, 
supr
he [limited] monopoly 
affo
. 
as to the availability of patent protection for an invention). 
 33, 37 (7th Cir. 1975)); accord Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron C
74). By one estimate, trade secre
a note 260, at 7. But see Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“State 
trade secret law . . . in its unlimited duration is clearly superior to t
rded by the patent laws . . . . [T]rade secret protection provides in some instances a 
substantial disincentive to entrance into the patent system, and thus deprives society of the 
benefits of public disclosure of the invention . . . .”). One empirical study reports that 
many firms find their own independent research to be a better source of information re-
garding competitors’ technologies than patent disclosures. Levin et al., supra note 123, at 
806. 
293 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 490. Moreover, trade secrets may be disclosed through li-
censing agreements. Id. at 486. 
294 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (describing conditions 
under which the prior user defense applies)
295 Jurisdictions that recognize the prior use defense generally restrict the transferabil-
ity of the defense. See, e.g., id. § 273(e)(1)(B) (limiting the transferability of the prior use 
defense under U.S. patent law). 
296 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481; see Jorda, supra note 260, at 1. 
297 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481. 
298 See id. at 487–89 (discussing the value of trade secrets when there is “a legitimate 
doubt” 
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num
enta ade 
secre  
trad o 
not m
erous empirical studies have found that, for some types of pat-
ble inventions, firms prefer to protect their discoveries with tr
ts rather than patents.299 Protecting an inventor’s reliance on
e secrecy therefore promotes innovation, and prior use rights d
aterially reduce incentives to innovate. 
 The scope of the prior use defense under U.S. patent law has fluc-
tuated recently, but it likely remains too weak to maximize competitive 
advantage. For many years, U.S. patent law lacked an explicit prior use 
defense,300 partly because U.S. patent law strongly favored the disclo-
sure of new discoveries. But it also generally protected public prior use 
by providing that such uses often completely invalidated later pat-
nts.301e  In contrast to public prior uses, U.S. patent law heavily disfa-
vored secret prior uses: 
As between a prior inventor who benefits from a process by 
selling its product but suppresses, conceals, or otherwise keeps 
the process from the public, and a later inventor who promptly 
files a [U.S.] patent application from which the public will 
gain a disclosure of the process, [U.S.] law favors the latter.302 
venE  secret prior uses were protected, however, provided that they were 
incidental to subsequent disclosure in a patent; if a secret prior user was 
the first inventor to discover an invention, but the second person to file 
a patent application, U.S. patent law would often grant patent rights to 
                                                                                                                      
299 Levin et al., supra note 123, at 794–95 (finding that firms believe secrecy to be more 
effective than patents for process inventions and vice versa for product inventions); see 
Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1290 (finding secrecy to be more effective than patents in 
protecting software inventions, although less effective than patents in protecting medical 
device and biotechnology inventions). One important benefit of trade secrecy over patents 
300 Before 1952, U.S. patent law did include a prior use defense. U.S. Patent & 
Tra
rior use took place either (1) before the patent owner’s date of inven-
tion e applied for the patent. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 10 2011). Moreover, for patents issued prior to 2012, a prior 
use cation can invalidate another inven-
tor’ 1, 1356, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 
200
k, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983). But 
see J te 260, at 1 (stating that “[p]atents and trade secrets are not incompati-
ble 
is that an inventor need not incur the significant cost of obtaining a patent. See Van Eecke 
et al., supra note 278, at 133 (noting that prior use rights allow prior users to avoid the 
high cost of obtaining a patent). 
demark Office, supra note 282, at 30. 
301 For patents issued prior to 2012, a prior use that was public will invalidate a patent, 
provided that the p
 or (2) more than a year before the patente
2(a)–(b) (2006) (amended 
kept secret during the pendency of a patent appli
s patent. See Flex-Rest, LLC v. Steelcase, Inc., 455 F.3d 135
6). 
302 W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garloc
orda, supra no
but dovetail”). 
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the secret prior user.303 Prior uses that were protected by trade secrets, 
however, received no protection from valid patents.304 
 Recent legal reforms have expanded prior use rights. In 1999, 
Congress created an explicit prior use defense in response to a decision 
by the Federal Circuit that broadened the patent eligibility of methods 
of conducting businesses.305 The new prior use defense, however, was 
limited to business method patents. Congress further restricted the new 
rio
 The Act, however, limited the prior use defense in two significant 
respects. First, the defense does not apply to inventions that, at the time 
of the invention, were “owned or subject to an obligation of assignment 
to 
                                                
p r use defense to uses that were “reduced to practice at least 1 year 
before the effective filing date of [a] patent” and “commercially used” 
before the effective filing date of a patent.306 
 On September 16, 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith Amer-
ica Invents Act, which drastically reshaped the law regarding prior us-
es.307 Perhaps most significantly, the Act changed the U.S. patent sys-
tem from a “first-to-invent” system to a “first-to-file” system. Under the 
new law, when two people independently discover an invention, the 
first person to file a patent application will obtain the patent on the in-
vention, even if that person was the second to discover the invention.308 
To ameliorate the impact of the new first-to-file system on initial inven-
tors who are second to file patent applications, the Act expanded the 
prior use defense to include all types of patented inventions.309 
either an institution of higher education . . . or a technology transfer 
organization for [such an institution].”310 Second, a prior commercial 
use must generally begin at least one year before the patent’s effective 
filin da 311g te.  A patentee can extend the required period for public use 
                                                                      
ub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 5, § 273, 125 Stat. 284, 285–87, 297 (2011) (codified at 
35 U
id. § 273(a). 
5)(A). This limitation does not apply if the invention’s reduction to 
pra
303 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006) (amended 2011). 
304 See id. § 102(a)–(b), (g). 
305 See State St. Bank & Trust, 149 F.3d at 1375–77. 
306 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)–(b) (2006) (amended 2011). 
307 See P
.S.C. § 273 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)). 
308 Id. § 102. 
309 See 
310 Id. § 273(e)(
ctice “could not have been undertaken using funds provided by the Federal Govern-
ment.” Id. § 273(e)(5)(B). This provision appears to apply, though, even if the institution 
of higher learning later transfers the patent to a private enterprise. See id. 
311 Id. § 273(a)(2). Under the older first-to-invent system, a secret prior user did not 
need to use an invention for more than a year to win a priority dispute. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) 
(2006) (amended 2011). 
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to almost two years by publicly disclosing the invention before filing a 
patent application.312 
 Importantly, the patent laws of many foreign jurisdictions recog-
ize
al use.316 For exam-
ple, under Korean patent law, the prior use defense applies to anyone 
who “[a]t the time of filing lication . . . has been work-
g [
n  a prior use defense that is not subject to these two limitations.313 
No other country in the world contains an exception to the prior use 
defense for patents developed by an “institution of higher educa-
tion.”314 Similarly, foreign patent systems do not require that a prior use 
be commercialized for lengthy time periods to be eligible for the de-
fense.315 Indeed, unlike the U.S. requirement for “commercial use” for 
at least one year before a patent’s filing date, most foreign patent sys-
tems require only that, before the filing date, a firm undertake “effec-
tive and serious preparations” to begin commerci
of a patent app
in an] invention commercially or industrially . . . or has been making 
preparations therefor.”317 Similarly, patent law in the United Kingdom 
requires only “effective and serious preparations” for commercial use 
before a patent’s filing date.318 
 Thus, the prior use defense is often narrower under U.S. patent 
w t 319la han under foreign patent law.  Consequently, stronger prior use 
defenses help rivalry to flourish in foreign countries, whereas  a weaker 
                                                                                                                      
312 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
313 Some of the other limitations in the U.S. prior use defense also appear in foreign 
patent laws, however. For example, under U.S. patent law, the prior user defense only ap-
plies to use “in the United States.” Id. § 273(a)(1). The patent laws of many European 
countries contain an analogous geographical requirement. Van Eecke et al., supra note 
278, at 99. 
314 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 282, at 28 (“In this regard, it appears 
that the United States is rather unique in including a provision benefitting the academic 
sect
ice, 
supr d serious preparation” explicitly qualifies as 
“com
t matter is established . . . shall be deemed to be commercially used.” See 35 
U.S.
, 
http
.”). 
or.”). 
315 Id. at 20–21. 
316 Van Eecke et al., supra note 278, at 103; accord U.S. Patent & Trademark Off
a note 282, at 15. One form of “effective an
mercial use” under U.S. law: “Subject matter for which commercial marketing or use 
is subject to a premarketing regulator review period during which the safety or efficacy of 
the subjec
C. § 273(c)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
317 T’ukhopop [Patent Law], Act No. 950, Nov. 28, 1949, art. 103, amended by Act No. 
9985, Jan. 27, 2010 (S. Kor.), translated in Republic of Korea, World Intell. Prop. Org.
://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=214463 (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
318 Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 64 (Eng.). 
319 See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 282, at 21 (“This makes the U.S. 
temporal approach significantly more restrictive than that for any other prior user rights 
system
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prior use defense limits domestic rivalry in the United States.320 
Strengthening the defense in the United States to align with the patent 
ws
.S. patents reduce U.S. 
competitive advantage. In contrast, due to limits on the extraterritorial 
effects of U.S. law, U.S. patents do not significantly undermine the 
competitive conditions facing foreign firms. 
                                                                                                                     
la  of other countries, however, would not significantly reduce incen-
tives to invent for U.S. companies. Consequently, to increase the com-
petitive advantage of U.S. firms, the United States should embrace 
harmonization regarding the prior use defense.321 
Conclusion 
 The competitive advantage of U.S. firms, particularly in industries 
characterized by high worker productivity, is vital to U.S. economic 
prosperity. As a result, to maintain or increase standards of living in the 
nitU ed States, lawmakers should work to maximize U.S. competitive 
advantage. U.S. patent law affects this goal in at least two respects. 
 First, U.S. patents provide incentives for U.S. firms to discover new 
inventions, and U.S. firms can use innovations to develop products and 
services that are better or cheaper than those offered by foreign rivals. 
Nevertheless, because U.S. patents also encourage foreign firms to de-
velop new technologies, the incentive effect of U.S. patents often pro-
vides little competitive advantage to U.S. firms compared to their in-
rnatte ional rivals. In fact, because only U.S. patents can be asserted in 
the United States and because the U.S. economy is the largest economy 
in the world, nonresident patent acquisition in the United States is 
more common than in many countries. 
 Second, U.S. patents undermine U.S. competitive advantage by 
restraining competition in the United States, including domestic ri-
valry. Intense domestic rivalry generally promotes competitive advan-
tage because it drives firms to improve, to reduce intrafirm inefficien-
cies, and to develop more advanced factors of production. Intense 
domestic rivalry also spawns related and supporting industries. By re-
ducing domestic rivalry in the United States, U
 
320 In fact, U.S. firms often cannot even compete equally against local firms in foreign 
jurisdictions that recognize robust prior use rights because those jurisdictions typically 
require prior use in that country. See id. at 21–22; Van Eecke et al., supra note 278, at 99. 
321 The extent to which expanding the scope of the prior use defense may affect U.S. 
competitiveness is, however, unclear. In many jurisdictions, few patent defendants rely on 
the defense. Van Eecke et al., supra note 278, at 106. As a result, some commentators 
have concluded that “the actual impact of prior user rights is quite small in practice.” Id. at 
135. 
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 Thus, it is likely that U.S. patents today often harm U.S. competi-
tive advantage more than they help it. Moreover, due to legal and eco-
nomic differences between the United States and other countries, for-
eign patents do not similarly undercut the competitive advantage of 
firms in other countries. For example, because foreign patent laws pro-
vide less powerful exclusive rights to inventors, foreign patents do not 
limit rivalry in those countries as much as U.S. patents limit domestic 
rivalry in the United States. 
 To maximize U.S. competitiveness, the strength of U.S. patent 
rights likely should be reduced, and this Article lends further support 
to a burgeoning call for weakening patent rights in the United States. 
U.S. lawmakers should nevertheless be cautious in doing so because 
U.S. patents provide important incentives to invent. One promising 
approach to weakening U.S. patent rights is to harmonize U.S. patent 
law with weaker foreign patent laws, where doing so would only mar-
ginally reduce incentives to innovate. This Article offers two examples 
of such an approach: expanding in the United States both the experi-
mental use defense and the prior use defense. 
